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Abstract 
Il presente studio si propone di analizzare una delle libertà 
fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, la Libertà di Stabilimento, in 
particolare, concentrandosi sull’applicazione di questa libertà, 
garantita dal Trattato sul Funzionamento dell’Unione Europea 
(TFEU), alle società. Gli Articoli 49 e 54 del TFEU permettono alle 
imprese di poter beneficiare della Libertà di Stabilimento. L’Articolo 
49 TFEU disciplina lo stabilimento “primario” e “secondario”, 
mentre, l’Articolo 54 TFUE identifica quali imprese possono 
beneficiare della libertà garantita dal Trattato. 
Il primo passo dell’analisi di questa libertà fondamentale consiste 
nello studiare le diverse teorie di riconoscimento delle società 
adottate da ciascuno degli Stati Membri dell’Unione Europea. Infatti, 
l’applicazione, da un lato, della teoria della “incorporazione”, e, 
dall’altro lato, l’applicazione della teoria della “sede reale”, da parte 
degli Stati Membri, ha creato problemi alle imprese Europee nel 
beneficiare di tale Libertà di Stabilimento. 
In una tale situazione, è stato richiesto l’intervento della Corte di 
Giustizia Europea, che ha dovuto, nel corso degli anni, prendere una 
serie di decisioni volte a rendere applicabile la Libertà di 
Stabilimento in modo non discriminatorio nei confronti di tutte le 
società non residenti in un dato Stato Membro. Lo studio svolgerà 
una attenta analisi delle sentenze della Corte di Giustizia Europea 
al fine di tracciare: l’evoluzione che ha subito negli anni la Libertà di 
Stabilimento, i suoi ambiti di applicazione e la conformità della 
teoria della “sede reale” con le regole stabilite dal Trattato sul 
Funzionamento dell’Unione Europea. Inoltre, lo studio dedica una 
sezione specifica al tema del rapporto fra la Libertà di Stabilimento 
e le diverse politiche fiscali applicate dai diversi Stati Membri.  
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Scopo dello studio, oltre all’attenta analisi della Libertà di 
Stabilimento, è quello di sottolineare come il corretto funzionamento 
della libertà di stabilimento necessiti di una più profonda 
armonizzazione del diritto societario fra i diversi Stati Membri, e, 
inoltre, identificare alcuni strumenti legali utili per raggiungere tale 
risultato. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Introduction 
The Freedom of Establishment is one of the fundamental Freedoms 
of the European Union. The right of Establishment, together with 
the others Freedoms, is necessary to assure the correct functioning 
of the Internal Market of the European Union.  
Within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the 
Internal Market was created in order to ensure the “free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital”.1 Thus, the 
contemporaneous correct functioning of each of the Freedoms of the 
European Union has gained critical importance, because if one of 
the European Freedoms does not work properly, then the correct 
functioning of the Internal Market could be jeopardised. 
In this work, we will analyse the Freedom of Establishment within 
the European Union with specific focus of how this principle ought 
to be applied to corporate firms. Today, the economy resulted even 
more globalised, in an age where the information are sent in two 
different point of the word in few seconds, with the economy 
characterized by even more open markets and with a greater 
possibility to delocalize business activity. Thanks to this kind of 
economy, the corporations could benefit of a lot of different solutions 
in order to carry on their business. In fact, companies could carry 
on their business in many countries at the same time; or decide to 
transfer part or entire of their establishment abroad; or decide to 
establish a secondary office in another EU Member State. Thus, the 
Freedom of Establishment constitutes an important element to be 
taken into account in connection with the location and re-location 
of corporations. 
                                       
1 Article n. 26 p. 2 of TFEU 
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In the Second chapter, we will focus on the different recognition 
theories adopted by each of the EU Member States. In fact, some EU 
Member States adopted the “incorporation” theory, while other EU 
Member States apply the “real seat” theory. The application of these 
different recognition theories by each Member State created critical 
issues in the application of the Freedom of Establishment to 
companies, which could only be resolved by the ECJ through a long 
series of decisions, which will be analysed in depth in the following 
chapter. 
In the third chapter, first we will focus on the analysis of the articles 
49 and 54, TFEU, concerned, respectively, with primary and 
secondary Freedom of Establishment and with the conditions under 
whom a corporation is entitled to enjoy it. Then, we will analyse the 
different cases decided, over years, by the European Court of 
Justice. The analysis of these cases is important because it helped 
in defining the scope of the Freedom of Establishment, when 
companies are involved, and because it resolved the question, raised 
among scholars, whether or not the “real seat” theory could coexist 
with the provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
In the fourth chapter, the study briefly analyses the problems 
relating to the harmonization of the legal systems of the EU Member 
States. In fact, the correct functioning of the Freedom of 
Establishment is tied to the level of the harmonization of the legal 
systems of the different EU Member States. 
This analysis of the evolution, over the years, of the Freedom of 
Establishment, concerned with companies’ “nationality”, will lead 
me to face some issues dealing with the current status of the 
Freedom of Establishment, and, in particular, with the current level 
of compliance with the EU law concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment, with respect to the “real seat” theory. Then, the 
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study will deal with the problem of the current harmonization of 
corporate law and with the issue whether or not there should be 
more harmonization throughout the EU, in order to improve a more 
consistent application of right of Establishment and, finally, with 
what kind of legal techniques could be used in order to attain a 
better level of harmonization. 
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2.1 Introduction 
A corporation created in accordance with a specific Law of Business 
Organizations does not incur any problems until it carries on its 
business within the State of incorporation. However, in an 
increasingly globalized economy, characterized by even more open 
markets and with a greater possibility to delocalize business activity, 
corporations could carry on their business in many countries, or 
decide to transfer part or entire of their establishment abroad or 
decide to establish a secondary office in another EU State. In this 
kind of economy, it could be increasingly difficult to identify which 
corporate law should govern the corporation2. In fact, whereas 
natural person and corporation hold a specific nationality, for 
corporations having connecting factors with different States, it is not 
easy to distinguish their nationality. 
The possibility to transfer the formal or real seat of the corporation, 
within the European Union, has been a very controversial topic in 
European company law. Legal continuity of the transferred 
company, its recognition in the State of destination (and sometimes 
in the State of origin), the rules applicable to the company that 
“emigrates”, are all issues subject to the legal systems applied in the 
countries involved in the transfer. The provision implementing the 
fundamental Freedom of Establishment within the European 
common market, as stated for the first time in the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, tried to make 
easier the transfer of the seat of the corporation3. 
However, since its introduction European corporations faced some 
problems with their own freedom of establishment, due to 
                                       
2 TORINO, R., Diritto di stabilimento delle società e trasferimento transnazionale 
della sede. Profili di diritto europeo e italiano, p.153 and foll. 
3 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.4 and foll. 
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limitations created by domestic legislation of each EU Member State 
and their respective private international law rules, that affected 
foreign companies right of establishment4. Such problems occurred 
especially when a EU Member State A company wished to  transfer 
its main office or to establish a branch office in another EU Member 
State B. Two doctrines: the “Incorporation theory” and the “Real Seat 
theory”, as disparately used by each EU Member States in order to 
determine which national corporate law should be enforced vis-à-vis 
a (foreign) corporations, were important driving factors in defining 
the issues about the scope of Freedom of Establishment5. The 
European Court of Justice tried to overcome these problematic legal 
issues through its decisions, thereby establishing the illegality of 
some national rules that conflicted with the companies’ right of 
establishment.6 In order to understand scope and implications of the 
issues, the European companies were confronted with exercising 
their freedom of establishment prerogatives, and with fully 
understanding the legal issues presented to (and solved by) the 
European Court of Justice during the past quarter of a century or 
so. 
2.2 The “Incorporation” theory 
The incorporation theory has its origins from the contractual 
theories of the corporations; the basic assumption of this theory is 
that only the will of incorporators is necessary to create the 
connection between the law of the chosen country and the 
                                       
4 BECHT, M., MAYER, C., WAGNER, H. F., Where Do Firms Incorporate? 
Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, p.241-243 
5 MUCCIARELLI, F. M., Companies’ Emigration and EC freedom of establishment, 
p.282 and foll. See also JOHNSON, M., Roll on the 14th Directive – Case law fails 
to solve the problems of corporate mobility within the EU – again, p. 10.  
6 TORINO, R., Diritto di stabilimento delle società e trasferimento transnazionale 
della sede. Profili di diritto europeo e italiano, p.153 and foll. 
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company7. Therefore, the company will be subject to the laws where 
the act of incorporation was completed (i.e. where it was filed with 
the competent national authority)8. The act of incorporation creates 
the sufficient connective link between the company and the legal 
system of the State, whereas the physical presence and/or personal 
connection with the State of incorporation would not be required9. 
The incorporation theory is generally applied by common law 
jurisdictions and partially by some civil law jurisdictions as 
Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden10, Switzerland, Russia11 and 
Finland. 
The company that adopts the incorporation theory could transfer its 
administrative seat in another juridical system without necessarily 
incurring in a winding up proceeding. Therefore, the corporation 
that has transferred its administrative seat remains subject to the 
corporate law of the State of incorporation, even if the corporation 
carries on its business only in another State. Generally, the 
corporate law of a State adopting the incorporation theory does not 
affect its “national” corporation that transferred its “real” seat in the 
host State, i.e. in another jurisdiction. 
Thus, the theory of incorporation enables the corporation’s founders 
to identify and choose ex ante the corporate law rules that better 
would fulfil their needs, due to the fact that the corporate law could 
remain unchanged throughout the life of society even if its real seat 
will be transferred abroad12. Therefore, under the incorporation 
                                       
7 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.51 and foll. 
8 GELTER, M., Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies, and the 
Court’s Accidental Vision for Corporate Law, p.3. 
9 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.49-51. 
10 Article 154 of the swiss Internationales Privatrecht. 
11 Articles 1202-1203 of the Russian Civil Code. 
12 ROTHE, N., Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European 
Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering 
Case, p.1110-1113. 
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theory, the place where the corporate business will be effectively 
exercised and the place where the company will be practically 
administered are not deemed as controlling factors in order to 
identify the nationality of the corporation, i.e. the corporate law rules 
to whom the company is subject. 
Jurisdictions adopting the theory of incorporation had to face the 
problem of “letterbox companies” creation: letterbox companies 
carry out their commercial activity in a State different from the State 
of incorporation (where they only have a “mail address”), so 
benefiting of a jurisdiction with a less strict legislation, sometimes 
deemed unable to properly protect the various categories of 
interested persons (“stakeholders”) and others companies who 
would enter into a either contractual or non-conctractual 
relationship with the “letterbox” corporations13.  
2.3 The “Real Seat” theory 
The real seat theory is adopted in the majority of civil law systems. 
Jurisdictions that adopt the real seat theory are essentially based 
on the idea that the company is ruled by the law of the place where 
the central management and control is located. The connecting 
factors in jurisdictions adopting the real seat theory are therefore 
objective and imperative, so that the founding members of a 
corporation do not have the possibility to choose on their own the 
more convenient law.14  
The real seat theory enforces the national law of the country where 
the administrative headquarters is located, because the purpose of 
                                       
13 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.12. 
14 GELTER, M., Centros, The Structure Of  Regulatory Competition In  European 
Corporate Law, p.248; PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private 
intenational law for Corporation, p. 7; MUCCIARELLI, F. M., Companies’ 
Emigration and EC freedom of establishment, p.284. 
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this theory is to protect economic interests of the host country. The 
national law of the country is applied to foreign entities that have a 
strong connection with the host State, with the objective to achieve 
two main objectives: The first goal is to avoid that the founding 
members of a corporation evade the national law by the creation of 
a pseudo-foreign corporation and the second is to protect the 
different stakeholders that enter in contact whit the corporation, 
providing a national law able to grant a sufficient level of 
protection.15 In the event the company does not deal with its 
formation requirements, the State where the company has its real 
seat can subject it to two kind of sanctions: the first is to deprive the 
company of legal subject status,  while the second sanction is to 
remove the limited liability right.16 
The countries  following this theory are France, Belgium, Poland, 
Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg and the Scandinavian countries. Some 
EU Member State jurisdictions, as the Italian, Spanish and 
Portuguese, decided to apply a mixed solution, half way between the 
real seat theory and the incorporation theory.17 
EU Member states usually apply two kinds of real seat theory: 
“symmetric” and “asymmetric”.  
A jurisdiction which applies the “symmetric” real seat theory does 
not accept the election of the applicable company law as made by 
the foreign corporation. The Member State adopting the “symmetric” 
real-seat doctrine binds its corporate law to the establishment of the 
                                       
15 LOMBARDO, S., La Libertà Comunitaria di Stabilimento delle Società dopo 
Überseering fra armonizzazione e concorrenza tra ordinamenti, p.460.; se also N. 
ROTHE, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European Union: An 
Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering Case, p.1111. 
16 http://europa.eu/epso/doc/en_lawyling.pdf 
17 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.49-51.; see 
also BECHT, M., MAYER, C., WAGNER, H. F., Where Do Firms Incorporate? 
Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, p.243. 
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real seat within the country and, on the other hand, states to 
renounce to export its corporate law; moreover companies that 
transfer their seat abroad have to wind-up the corporation and must 
then to reincorporate it in the new State. 
When the “asymmetric” real seat theory is applied, the host State 
does not impose to the corporation any change in the applicable law 
rules: hence, a foreign corporate firm is free to choose its national 
corporate law and the place of its real seat does not matter. When, 
in a EU Member State, is applied the real-seat doctrine, a 
corporation wishing to avoid to incur in the obligations of its 
regulation, must move the corporation headquarters in another 
State, and become subject, through a transfer of the registered seat, 
to the LoBOs of the host State.18 
2.4 A comparison between the recognition theories 
As already pointed out, the incorporation theory argues that the 
legal order which created the corporation should also govern its 
organizations and its operations; according to this theory, the State 
of incorporation is supposed to be the most interested to regulate 
the internal affairs of the companies. One advantage of this 
recognition theory is that the parties involved in a proceeding should 
easily be put in the position to identify ex ante the law that governs 
the proceeding, certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, 
protection of justified expectation of the parties.19 The incorporation 
theory was considered a driving factor of the economic development 
                                       
18 BECHT, M., MAYER, C., WAGNER, H. F., Where Do Firms Incorporate? 
Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, p.241-243; see also ENRIQUES, L., GELTER, 
M., How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and 
Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, p.585. 
19 ROTHE, N., Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European 
Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering 
Case, p.1112. 
19 
 
of a country, and good examples of it are the Netherlands and the 
State of Delaware in the United States.20 However, the incorporation 
theory shows some drawbacks, as, for example, the the State of 
incorporation law abuse or the indirect promotion of the letterbox 
companies (i.e. companies that do not have any substantial type of 
connection with the State of incorporation other than the very act of 
incorporation).21 The most important critique to the incorporation 
theory is that it would have permitted the founding members to set 
up companies in legal system that are deemed more lenient under 
various respects.22 The State of Delaware, for instance, registered a 
huge numbers of corporations when it decided to apply the 
incorporation theory. As a consequence, the principle of the 
“pseudo-foreign” corporation and some anti-abuse policies have 
been enforced in many common law and in Netherlands jurisdiction, 
in order to successfully face this kind of weakness.23 
The real seat theory ensures that the law of the State most affected 
by the action of the corporation (i.e. usually its centre of 
administration) will be applied. The implementation of this theory 
provides a better protection of the host State domestic market and –
so it is often argued- a better protection of stakeholders of the 
company (and especially of corporates creditors)24.  
                                       
20 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.16. 
21 NOVOTNÁ, P., Freedom Of Establishment After Cartesio; see also 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/letterbox-company.html; 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/letter-box-company/ 
22 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.16. 
PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.17. 
24 ROTHE, N., Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European 
Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering 
Case, p.1111. 
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However, the real seat theory may show some disadvantages, 
because sometimes it is not easy to determine the “real seat”, as we 
could find different terms and concepts concerning the real seat 
theory in different States; finally, the real seat doctrine has been 
criticized also because it tends to limit the scope of the parties’ 
autonomy in companies founding and in its selling of control.25 
2.5 The “Nationality” of the corporations in Italy 
Article 25(1) of Law no. 218 of May 1995 stated, as general rule, that 
corporations are governed by the law of the State of incorporation: 
thus, Italian system of private international law appears to follows, 
at first glance, the theory of incorporation.26 However, in the second 
paragraph, article 25 states that in the case where the 
administrative seat or principal activity of the company is located in 
Italy, Italian law will be applied to govern the company, even if the 
constitution of the company was perfected in another jurisdiction.27 
Italian courts have the duty to interpret these terms. In those cases 
when the court decides that the administrative seat or the main 
corporate business purpose of the corporation is carried out in Italy, 
the real seat theory will replace the incorporation theory.28 
In Italy as soon as the administrative seat or the centre of activities 
of the company are identified within the Italian territory, the 
company incorporated in another State will be subject to all 
requirements of the Italian law, including the requirement of 
registration. Corporations that do not comply with the requirement 
                                       
25 PANNIER, M., Nationality of Corporations Under Domestic Law: A Comparative 
Perspective 
26 L. 31 Maggio 1995 n. 218 
27 MUCCIARELLI, F. M., Companies’ Emigration and EC freedom of establishment, 
p.289. 
28 TORINO, R., Diritto di stabilimento delle società e trasferimento transnazionale 
della sede. Profili di diritto europeo e italiano, p.156 and foll; see also BORG-
BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.49-51. 
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of conforming to Italian law and the procedures of registration under 
Italian company law, will be penalized by establishing the 
application of the unlimited liability rule of the person(s) acting on 
behalf of the company. 
According to article 25(2) of law no 218, the extent of article 25(1) 
covers the legal status of the entity, its name, its incorporation, 
transformation and dissolution, its capacity, its establishment and 
the powers of its organs, agency, the acquisition or loss of 
membership of the company and also the right and obligation 
resulting thereof, the liability for its obligations, and the 
consequences of breach of the articles of association. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE CORPORATE 
RECOGNITION AND THE EU CASE 
LAW ON FREEDOM OF 
ESTABLISHMENT 
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SECTION 3.A: Freedom of Establishment and 
Corporate Recognition 
3.1 Introduction 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
“TFEU”), articles 49 and 54 (formerly articles 43 and 48 of the TEC), 
provides a general framework about the Freedom of Establishment. 
The Freedom of Establishment is one of the fundamental European 
freedoms and, together with all European freedoms, assure the 
functioning of the European Internal Market. The other European 
Freedoms ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and 
capitals. Thus, thanks to the EU Freedoms, the European internal 
market could work correctly; the incorrect application of one of the 
European freedoms could affect the proper working of the other 
freedoms and, as a result, the correct functioning of the European 
internal market. 
The Freedom of Establishment with respect to companies was not 
followed by secondary European legislation: thus, the task to define 
its extent and to coordinate domestic provisions of international 
private law was left to the European Court of Justice.29  
                                       
29 Within the TFEU articles 50 and 81 provide a basis for legislation on the private 
international law of companies. Article 50 states: “1. In order to attain freedom of 
establishment as regards a particular activity, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall act by means of 
directives…”.  
Article 81 states: “1. The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters 
having cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include 
the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market,..” 
24 
 
Article 54 of the TFEU equates companies validly established in a 
EU Member State, having registered office, central administration, 
centre of business operations within EU, to natural persons national 
of a EU Member State.  
Problems arise as the Member States adopt different ways to 
recognise the legal personality of a company and to identify the 
national law to which that organisation should be subject to. 
This situation has characterized the European Union law concerning 
companies for many years and undermined the correct functioning 
of the European internal market, which is based on the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. 30 
A key step in the harmonisation process of rules governing the 
recognition of companies has to be found in the 1968 Convention on 
the Mutual Recognition of Companies; however, has it will be further 
explained under paragraph 3.2 (infra), the convention failed to reach 
its objective because EU Member States refused to ratify it.31 
Article 293 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
affirmed an important rule about the recognition and mobility of 
companies; in fact it stated: “Member States shall, so far as is 
necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to 
securing for the benefit of their nationals: 
.. the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning 
of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal 
personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to 
another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or firms 
governed by the laws of different countries;”. 
                                       
30 JOHNSON, M., Roll on the 14th Directive – Case law fails to solve the problems 
of corporate mobility within the EU – again, p.9-13. 
31 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.104 and 
foll. 
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The European Union up today does not start neither conclude any 
negotiation about the recognition and mobility of companies, or 
more in general regarding the corporate law, even if this matter was 
already faced by the Member States since a long time.32 
 
3.2 Convention on the Mutual Recognition of 
Companies 
The Member States on 29 February 1968 signed in Brussels the 
Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, while at the 
same time the same Member States signed a protocol that allowed 
the European Court of Justice to interpret the Convention.33 
The Member States were not able to reach an agreement, and finally 
the Netherlands decided not to ratify the Convention on the Mutual 
Recognition of Companies. This negative result could be considered 
an important driving factor that slowed the application of the rules 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment.34 
Article 1 of the convention stated: “Companies under civil or 
commercial law, including co-operative societies, established in 
accordance with the law of a Contracting State which grants them 
the capacity of persons having rights and duties, and having their 
statutory registered office in the territories to which the present 
Convention applies, shall be recognized as of right.”. This article 
shows that the theory of incorporation was the starting point, 
utilized by the Convention, to shape the mutual recognition of 
corporations.  
                                       
32 However, it should be pointed out the importance of the Directive 2005/56/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border 
mergers of limited liability companies. This directive constituted an important step 
in the development of the Freedom of Establishment 
33 SANTA MARIA, A., European Economic Law, p. 9. 
34 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.110. 
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However article 3 of the Convention stated: “Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, any Contracting State may declare that it will not apply 
the present Convention to any companies or bodies corporate 
specified in Articles 1 and 2 which have their real registered office 
outside the territories to which the present Convention applies, if 
such companies or bodies corporate have no genuine link with the 
economy of one of the said territories.”. This provision, together with 
article 4, shows as the Convention provided to Member States the 
possibility to avoid or interdict the use of the State of incorporation 
law and the possibility to adopt their national law. In addition, the 
provisions of the Convention could create uncertainty about the 
conflict between the real seat and the incorporation rules, and the 
European Court of Justice had to resolve the question that arise 
from this uncertainty.35 
The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, despite 
the negative outcome36, was an important step made by the Member 
States in order to harmonize corporate law. 
3.3 The fundamental Freedom of Establishment within 
EU law 
Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU regulate the fundamental economic 
Freedom of Establishment; these general rules, over the years and 
together with the decisions of the ECJ, provided corporations and 
companies in general the necessary basis, in order to enjoy the 
Freedom of Establishment. 
Article 49 set forth the so-called “primary” and “secondary” Freedom 
of Establishment; moreover the first sentence of Articles 49 of the 
                                       
35 SANTA MARIA, A., European Economic Law, p. 10-12. 
36 MUCCIARELLI, F. M., Companies’ Emigration and EC freedom of establishment, 
p.276. 
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TFEU bans every restriction to Freedom of Establishment 
implemented by Member States. 
The “primary” Freedom of Establishment37 allows nationals of any 
Member State to transfer their domicile or residence, in order to 
pursue an economic relevant activity, in any EU Member State. The 
“secondary” Freedom of Establishment provides the freedom to: “... 
setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any 
Member State established in the territory of any Member State.”38  
Member States are to same extent, still allowed to enforce their 
domestic laws and regulations in order to setup restrictions on 
Freedom of Establishment on (restrictive and proportional) grounds 
of “…public policy, public security or public health”39 and moreover 
on ground of the exercise of official authority.40 These types of 
restrictions have been constantly construed as an exception to the 
general Freedom of Establishment rules: the European Court of 
Justice clearly stated that this restrictions must be interpreted 
narrowly.41 The ECJ, in the Gebhard case (1995) pinpointed that: 
“national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must 
fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment 
of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it.”.42 
                                       
37 Article 49, Par. 2, of TFEU. 
38 Article 49, Par.1, TFEU. 
39 Article 52, par.1, TFEU. 
40 Article 51 TFUE. 
41 WEISS, F., KAUPA, C., European Union Internal Market Law, P.243. 
42 Case C-55/94, Gebhard. 
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When Member States did not reach an agreement for the 
harmonization of corporate law and a secondary legislation about 
Freedom of Establishment was not available, the European Court of 
Justice took part in the integration and direct application of the 
articles 49 and 54 of TFUE. 
Therefore, the rest thus chapter will be focusing in the analysis of 
the most relevant cases dealt with by the ECJ in the matter of 
Freedom of Establishment concerning companies.  
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SECTION 3.B: The decisions of the European Court of 
Justice ("ECJ") on Freedom of Establishment 
3.4 Daily Mail  
3.4.1 The Facts 
The Corporation Daily Mail and General Trust PLC was a limited 
liability company incorporated in England with its real and formal 
seat in London. The Daily Mail corporation (hereinafter, simply 
“Daily Mail") made an application to the UK Treasury because it 
wanted to transfer its administrative seat (for tax purposes) in the 
Netherlands. The idea of the company, after having changed its seat 
to the Netherlands, was to sell a substantial part of its non-
permanent assets and then buy, using the money obtained from the 
operation, a part of its shares. Thanks to the transfer of the seat, the 
company, as company resident in the Netherlands, could avoid the 
payment of capital gain tax and advance corporation tax43 in the 
United Kingdom. Of course, taxes on income generated domestically 
would have been due to United Kingdom in any case.  
United Kingdom applies the Incorporation doctrine: hence, a 
corporation can transfer its seat in another State without losing its 
nationality and maintaining its legal personality. In addition, the law 
of Netherlands adopts the incorporation theory, and it allows the 
transfer of the real seat.  
However, the Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, before starting the 
transfer of seat, needed the consent of the Treasury of the United 
Kingdom for tax purposes.44 
                                       
43 The United Kingdom tax that consists on prepayment of corporate taxes by 
companies distributing dividends to shareholders; abolished in 1999. 
44 According to the income and corporation tax act 1970 of United Kingdom, 
Section 482(1) stated: “Subject to the provisions of this section, all transactions of 
the following classes shall be unlawful unless carried out with the consent of the 
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Daily Mail and General Trust PLC brought an action before the 
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice arguing that 
under articles 52 of European Economic Community Treaty the 
Corporation could transfer its seat in the Netherlands without the 
prior consent of the Treasury of United Kingdom. The High Court of 
Justice decided to submit to the European Court of justice two 
preliminary questions. 
The first question asked the European Court of Justice if articles 52 
to 58 of the EEC Treaty (article 49 to 55 TFEU) allowed a corporation, 
with its central management and control in a Member State, to 
transfer its central management and control into another Member 
State without the prior consent or approval by the institution of the 
Member State of origin. The second question concerned the 
applicability to companies of Directive 73/148 on the abolition of 
restrictions on movement and residence of nationals of Member 
States within the European Community. 45 
3.4.2 The judgement of the ECJ 
With regard to the first question, the European Court of Justice in 
its judgement affirmed that the national law where the company was 
incorporated and the national law where it decided to transfer its 
seat governs the conditions necessary to successfully complete the 
transfer.46 
The Court reiterates that Freedom of Establishment is one of the 
fundamental Freedoms of the Community and that the rules 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment have been directly 
applicable to nationals of Member States since the end of the 
                                       
Treasury, that is to say” and continue in letter (a) “for a body corporate resident 
in the United Kingdom to cease to be so resident.” 
45 Report for the Hearing — Case 81/87 p.5488. 
46 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (14). 
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transitional period. The provisions concerning Freedom of 
Establishment should be applied also to the corporation as legal 
person. These rules aimed to ensure that natural persons and 
corporations of a Member State receive the same treatment of 
nationals (including corporations) of the host Member State. 
Moreover, these provisions do not allow obstacles implemented by 
the Member State of origin to the establishment of its nationals and 
corporations in another Member State.47  
As stated before, articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty afford companies 
the fundamental economic Freedom of Establishment: companies 
can also set up agencies, branches or secondary offices and have the 
right to incorporate in another Member State. The Daily Mail case 
differs from the above described situation because the corporation 
asked to re-incorporate in another Member State while, at the same 
time, wanted to retain its legal status as a corporation of United 
Kingdom.48 
According to the statements of the Court, some Member States allow 
their companies to transfer their central administration into another 
Member State; however, Member States are free to implement 
certain types of restrictions, but the legal consequences change 
depending on the considered Member State.49 The Court, in this 
judgment, assumed a conservative position, thereby adopting a 
cautious interpretation of the Treaty rules. 
Therefore, the European Court of Justice stated: “unlike natural 
persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state 
of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by 
                                       
47 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (15). 
48  VALK, O., C-210/06 Cartesio Increasing corporate mobility through outbound 
establishment. P.159 
49 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (20). 
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virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their 
incorporation and functioning”. Moreover, the Court considered on 
the same level the three connecting factors, set forth in (today) article 
54 par. 1 TFEU, i.e., registered office, central administration and 
principal place of business of a company. Furthermore, no 
agreements were accomplished between the Member States to the 
effect of retaining the legal personality, when a company decided to 
transfer its registered office from a Member State to another.50 
Under these conditions, the European Court of Justice specified that 
the provisions provided by article 52 and 58 do not resolve the 
problems concerning the connecting factors and the transfer, from 
one Member State to another, of the registered office or real head 
office of a company; these matters should be addressed by future 
legislation or conventions. Hence, according to the Court, Articles 52 
and 58 of the Treaty “cannot be interpreted as conferring on 
companies incorporated under the law of a Member State a right to 
transfer their central management and control and their central 
administration to another Member State while retaining their status 
as companies incorporated under the legislation of the first Member 
State.”. Therefore, a company incorporated in a Member State, with 
the registered office therein, does not have any right, provided by the 
Treaty, when decides to transfer its central management and control 
into another Member State.51 
The European Court of Justice answered to the second question 
arguing that the Directive 73/148 of 21 May 1973 governs only the 
movement and residence of natural persons. The provisions hold by 
the directive are not applicable by analogy to legal persons.52 
                                       
50 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (19). 
51 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (21). 
52 Judgment of the Court in case 81/87 point (28). 
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3.4.3 Comments to the ECJ judgement 
The European Court of Justice in its ruling of the debated Daily Mail 
case confirmed the validity of the tax rules enforced by the United 
Kingdom. The Court put the different connecting factors on the same 
level, thus there could not be drawn a preference regarding one of 
the connecting liks set forth in article 54 TFEU (registered office, 
central administration and principal place of business of a 
company). 
In its judgement the European Court of Justice specified that the 
corporations are creatures of the national law. According to the 
European Court of Justice, companies exist only by virtue of the 
varying national legislation which determines their incorporation 
and functioning. Through its ruling, the European Court of Justice 
confirmed the possibility for the EU Member States of Incorporation 
to govern the conditions by which a corporation could transfer its 
seat into another EU Member State. Thus, in an outbound case, a 
corporation, because its functioning and incorporation is to be 
governed by the EU Member State of Incorporation, must comply 
with the requirements of the State of origin before transferring its 
seat into the host EU Member State. 
The Judgement of the European Court of Justice produced different 
reactions among scholars and jurists; they theorized that the 
primary Freedom of Establishment ended due to the judgement of 
the Court. According to this theory the judgment of the Daily Mail 
case undermined the functioning of the EU internal market and in 
general blocked the European integration. 53 
Other Scholars argued that the Daily Mail decision, gave an 
advantage position to the real seat theory within the conflict between 
                                       
53 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.112. 
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the recognition theories, in contrast with the Sergers case54 
judgement, which seemed to favour the incorporation theory 
instead. However, it should be considered that the dispute did not 
present conflicts about the recognition theories or the connecting 
factors of the company, because both the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, applied the criterion of the incorporation theory.55 
Behrens, argued that Member State could choose between the two 
recognition theories freely, but, in his opinion, the real seat theory 
(as adopted in Germany and in other jurisdictions) would breach the 
provision concerning the Freedom of Establishment, because he 
considered that the real seat theory involved unjustifiably and 
discriminatory restrictions to corporations that wanted to transfer 
their seat both in Germany and outside.56 Conversely Loussouarn, 
affirmed that the case law undermined the position of the real seat 
                                       
54 Mr. Segers, a Dutch citizen, in April 1981 formed a limited liability company 
accordingly to the United Kingdom law, and placed the headquarters of the 
company in London. Mr Sergers wanted to carry on his business exclusively in 
the Netherlands through a branch named Slenderose Ltd. 
In July 1981, Mr. Segers gave to the Slenderose Ltd all the shares of his Dutch 
company called Free international promotion, whose headquarters was placed in 
the Netherlands.  
In order to obtain sickness insurance benefits, Mr Segers registered as sick with 
the Association called the Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank. That body refused to grant 
him such benefits because in its opinion he had no the necessary employment 
contract with Slenderose Ltd. 
The Court of Justice found that such treatment constitutes an indirect obstacle 
to the Freedom of Establishment, because through its rules the Netherlands 
restricts the free establishment of the company of the other Member State. 
55 GELTER, M., Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies, and the 
Court’s Accidental Vision for Corporate Law, p. 16-19. 
56 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.36. 
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theory. Finally, The European Court of Justice in its judgement 
assured that the rules of the Treaty were not used to avoid national 
tax laws.57 
3.5 Centros 
3.5.1 The Facts 
Mrs Bryde was the shareholder and administrator of the Centros ltd. 
In 1992, the administrator asked for the registration of the act of 
incorporation of the company in the Danish registrar, because Mrs 
Bryde wanted to open a subsidiary in Denmark. The objective of 
Centros ltd was to carry out its businesses in many commercial 
sectors, including the provision of loans. 58  However, the company 
shareholders, the Danish couple composed by Mrs Bryde and her 
husband, effectively wanted to carry out, through the corporation, 
only an activity of import and export in the wine sector.59  
Under the Danish law, companies established in a Member State 
when whishing to carry out an activity in Denmark have to establish 
a branch there. The Danish Trade and Companies Board firstly must 
register the corporation and only after this step the company is 
allowed to carry out its economic activity. 60 
The Danish Trade and Companies Board refused to register a branch 
of the English corporation, based on the assumption that its 
shareholders were both resident in Denmark and wanted to operate 
only their import and export business in Denmark. 
                                       
57 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.37. 
58 Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola. 
59 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (2). 
60 Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola; see also Articles 117-122 of 
Lovbekendtgørelse. 
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After the refusal to register by the Danish authorities, Centros ltd 
brought an action before the Østre Landsret. Centros Ltd did not 
accept the refusal because in its opinion articles 52 and 58 of the 
EC Treaty gave to it the right to establish a branch in Denmark. 
The Supreme Court of Denmark brought the question before the 
European Court of Justice asking: “Is it compatible with Article 52 
of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with Articles 56 and 58 thereof, to 
refuse registration of a branch of a company which has its registered 
office in another Member State and has been lawfully founded with 
company capital of GBP 100 (approximately DKK 1.000) and exists 
in conformity with the legislation of that Member State, where the 
company does not itself carry on any business but it is desired to 
set up the branch in order to carry on the entire business in the 
country in which the branch is established, and where, instead of 
incorporating a company in the latter Member State, that procedure 
must be regarded as having been employed in order to avoid paying 
up company capital of not less than DKK 200.000 (at present DKR 
125.000)?”.61 
Centros Ltd had been established in United Kingdom probably in 
order to avoid the narrower Danish corporate law concerning the 
minimum required capital and to pursue its activity only in 
Denmark through a Danish subsidiary. 
The Danish Trade and Companies Board rejected the demand of 
registration because, according to its opinion, the corporation 
wanted, through the branch, to establish in Denmark its main place 
of business. According to the Danish government articles 52 and 58 
of the EC Treaty were not to apply because the shares of the 
company were held by persons resident in and nationals of Denmark 
                                       
61 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (13) 
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who wanted to conduct their business there. Therefore, there were 
not the transnational elements necessary to apply the Treaty 
articles.62 
3.5.2 The Judgement of the ECJ 
According to the European Court of Justice when a national of a 
Member State decides to establish a company in another Member 
State having, in his opinion, a less restrictive corporate law does not 
constitute an abuse of the Freedom of Establishment. The rules of 
the Treaty guarantee the primary and secondary Freedom of 
Establishment for nationals and companies of the EU Member 
States, moreover even if the company law among the Member States 
is not fully harmonised, this circumstance does not constitute an 
impediment for the Freedom of Establishment.63 
The European Court of Justice in its judgment resumed its decision 
of the Sergers case, arguing that a corporation has the right to 
benefit of the Treaty rules, notwithstanding it does not carry out any 
economic activity in the State of incorporation and conducts its 
business entirely in the State were its branch is located. These 
elements are not sufficient to demonstrate the presence of an abuse 
or an illicit behaviour, hence the Member States cannot hinder the 
application of the EC Treaty provisions.64 
Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty do not allow Member States to refuse 
to register a secondary office of a corporation formed accordingly to 
the law of a Member State “with the result that the secondary 
                                       
62 BORG-BARTHET, J., The Governing Law of Companies in EU Law, p.114. 
63 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (27) and point 
(28). 
64 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (29). 
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establishment escapes national rules on the provision for and the 
paying-up of a minimum capital.”65 
The Danish Trade and Companies Board affirmed that the minimum 
capital requirements were necessary in order to guarantee the 
financial soundness of the corporation and to protect all of the 
company creditors by anticipating the risk of fraudulent bankruptcy 
due to the companies insolvency.66 The European Court of Justice 
responded to this reasoning considering the judgement of the 
precedent case law. The Court explained that “national measures 
liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they 
must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be 
justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order 
to attain it.”67 
The measures taken by the Danish authorities did not comply with 
the requirements of the Gebhard test. Firstly the refusal of The 
Danish Trade and Companies Board to register the company’s 
branch did not protect company creditors, because if the corporation 
had carried its business also in United Kingdom the Danish 
authorities would have agreed to register the branch of Centros ltd. 
Hence, company creditors in this situation would have been exposed 
in the same way. Secondly, according to the European Court of 
Justice the Danish authorities could apply measures which could 
                                       
65 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (30). 
66 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (32). 
67 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (34). 
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interfere in a minor way against the fundamental European 
Freedoms.68 
The European Court of Justice answered the question arguing that: 
“It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the EC Treaty for a Member 
State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its 
registered office but in which it conducts no business…”. According 
to the European Court of Justice restrictions to the establishment 
of a company subsidiary validly registered in another Member State 
are not acceptable, even if the corporation does not carry out any 
business in the State of incorporation and wants to carry out its 
entire business in the country were intends to establish its branch. 
For the European Court of Justice the fact that a corporation is 
incorporated in a State were the corporate law is less strict, with the 
aim to avoid the narrower corporate rules of the State were the 
corporation intends to establish the secondary office and to really 
carry on its business, is an allowed operation. The Court continues 
stating “That interpretation does not, however, prevent the 
authorities of the Member State concerned from adopting any 
appropriate measure for preventing or penalising fraud, either in 
relation to the company itself, if need be in cooperation with the 
Member State in which it was formed, or in relation to its members, 
where it has been established that they are in fact attempting, by 
means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations 
towards private or public creditors established in the territory of the 
Member State concerned.”.69 
                                       
68 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (37). 
69 Judgment of the Court 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (39). 
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3.5.3 Reactions to the Centros judgement 
The Centros case law is considered one of the leading case 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment because it confirmed the 
precedent judgement of the Sergers case law. In fact, according to 
the point of view of the Court an operation such as the proceeding 
falls within the scope of the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment. Thus, thanks to the decision of the European Court 
of Justice, a corporation validly incorporated into an EU Member 
State could open a branch into another EU Member State even if the 
corporation carry on its economic activity only in the EU Member 
State where it opened its branch.  
The ruling of the European Court of Justice introduced an important 
innovation in the Centros case law. The Court decided to adopt in 
this case law an instrument able to assess the compatibility of the 
restriction enforced by an EU Member State with the right of 
Establishment. The Court applied the Gebhard test in order to 
identify a possible breach of the right of establishment by the 
Denmark authority. 
This case concerned the recognition of a formally foreign company, 
rather than the connection between a company and its state of 
incorporation, nevertheless the decision of the European Court of 
Justice created a debate among the scholars about the relationship 
between the compatibility of the real seat theory and the Freedom of 
Establishment. 
The German jurists were particularly interested in the relationship 
between the real seat theory and the Freedom of Establishment. For 
example, Forsthoff based his assumption getting as basis the most 
restrictive German jurisprudence concerning the matter of branch 
of foreign corporations recognition. Forstthoff started his study 
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asking to himself what could had happened if the Centros case was 
to confront German jurisprudence. He argued that according to this 
doctrine Centros Ltd did not exist as a legal entity because Germany 
applies the real seat doctrine, which is accepted by the European 
Authorities (“principal place of business” is one of the three 
connecting links mentioned under art. 54TFEU). Moreover, the 
European authorities did not express any condition to the choice on 
the matter of private international corporate law. Thus, through 
these arguments, Forsthoff tried to explain that the Centros case did 
not hit the admissibility of the real seat theory and in addition, the 
author shows that the precedent decisions of the European Court of 
Justice were not changed by the judgement of the Centros case.70 
Professor Kindler, another German jurist, stated that from the Daily 
Mail decision the European judges had shown impartiality between 
the choices of the corporate law. In his opinion, the Freedom of 
Establishment is subject to the private international corporate law 
and the recognition theory choosen by a Member State. Therefore, 
whether a corporation formed accordingly to a foreign corporate law 
is subject to the German corporate law, due to the German 
recognition theory, could not carry out its economic activity under 
the foreign corporate law.71 
Denmark failed to refuse the recognition of Centros ltd and to avoid 
the opening of a branch of that corporation because it based its 
justification on the abuse of the European rules. Germany and the 
countries that adopt the symmetric real seat theory might refuse the 
                                       
70 BALLARINO, T., Sulla mobilità delle società nella Comunità Europea, da Daily 
Mail a Überseering: norme imperative, norme di conflitto e libertà comunitarie, p. 
681. 
71 BALLARINO, T., Sulla mobilità delle società nella Comunità Europea, da Daily 
Mail a Überseering: norme imperative, norme di conflitto e libertà comunitarie, p. 
682, 683. 
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registration of the branch due to the fact that according to this 
particular recognition theory the legal entity did not exist. Centros 
ldt had to wind-up and then incorporate in the country where it 
decided to locate its real seat.  
Some authors argued that the decision of the European Court of 
Justice made it impossible to use the real seat theory within the 
European Union; hence the only possible solution was to replace the 
real seat theory and apply the incorporation theory. The Austrian 
Supreme Court few month later declared that the real seat theory 
could not be used due to the judgement of the Centros case. The 
supporter of the real seat theory condemned the decision of the 
Austrian Supreme Court because in their opinion the Austrian 
Supreme Court thought that the Danish corporate law applied the 
real seat theory and assumed that the European Court of Justice 
ruled on the choice of the recognition theory adopted by the Member 
States.72 On the other hand, some author pointed out that both 
United Kingdom and Denmark applied the incorporation theory, 
thus under this condition the real seat theory was not touched by 
the decision of the European Court of Justice.  
Some scholars affirmed that due to the Centros decision the real seat 
doctrine cannot be used to hinder the transfer of the real seat of a 
corporation out from the Member State of origin to another Member 
State, forcing the corporation to a prior winding up.73 Member States 
should take measures in order to recognise the foreign companies 
established accordingly to the criteria of the registered office, the 
central administration, the centre of business operations, identified 
                                       
72 GELTER, M., Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies, and the 
Court’s Accidental Vision for Corporate Law, p.23. 
73 EBKE, W. F., Centros- Some realities and Mysteries-, p.627. 
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by the article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
Another school of thought argued that it was the European Court of 
Justice through the judgment in the Centros case to elevate the 
incorporation theory as the European doctrine of corporate law, but 
in some cases the EU Member States could apply their mandatory 
statutory lex fori instead the incorporation theory.74 
However, a large majority of scholars sustained that the decision of 
the European Court of Justice did not concern the primary Freedom 
of Establishment or the choice of the corporate law, but instead that 
decision concerned only the secondary Freedom of Establishment.75 
The judgement of the Centros case lead to a debate concerning the 
company policy issue. Therefore, the decision of the European Court 
of Justice started a competition among the EU Member States about 
the corporate law. This kind of competition according to the scholars 
will lead to a “race to the bottom” of corporate law; hence, business 
will be interested just in the most suitable corporate law.76  
Finally, the judgement of the Centros case helped to better 
understand and to narrow the doctrine of abuse of the European 
laws. According to the decision stated in the Judgement of the 
European Court of Justice, national courts have to decide “case by 
case, on the basis of objective evidence, of abuse or fraudulent 
conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where 
appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of 
Community law on which they seek to rely, they must nevertheless 
assess such conduct in the light of the objectives pursued by those 
                                       
74 EBKE, W. F., Centros- Some realities and Mysteries-, p.627. 
75 EBKE, W. F., Centros- Some realities and Mysteries-, p.628. 
76 BALLARINO, T., Sulla mobilità delle società nella Comunità Europea, da Daily 
Mail a Überseering: norme imperative, norme di conflitto e libertà comunitarie, p. 
680. 
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provisions.”77 Moreover since the Centros case, the issues 
concerning the abuse of the European provisions was faced widely 
in the Van Binsberg case and then in the TV-10 case. Van Bisbergen 
was a Dutch national and a Dutch legal representative. Van 
Binsbergen during the course of a proceeding, decided to transfer 
his residence from the Netherlands to Belgium. Thus, his capacity, 
as a legal representative, to represent the party in question before 
the Centrale Raad van Beroep (one of the three highest 
administrative courts in Netherlands) was questioned, because a 
provision of Netherlands stated that only persons established in the 
Netherlands may act as legal representatives before that court. Van 
Binsbergen argued that this rule was contrary to articles 59 and 60 
of the Treaty.  
The European Court of Justice stated that the specific requirements 
which a EU Member State requires to persons providing such a 
service, comply with the provisions of the Treaty, when these 
requirements are needed in order to apply professional rules, 
justified by the public interest, which are binding upon any person 
established in the State in which the service is provided. According 
to the European Court of Justice, the requirements enforced by the 
EU Member State comply with the Treaty when “the person 
providing the service would escape from the ambit of those rules 
being established in another Member State”.78 
In fact, a EU Member State can apply rules in order to prevent that 
a person providing services entirely or principally within its territory 
to benefit of article 59 of the Treaty, with the purpose “of avoiding 
                                       
77 Judgement of the Court, Case 9. 3. 1999 — Case C-212/97 point (25) 
78 Judgement of the Court, Case 3. 12. 1974 — Case 33/74 point (12) 
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the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him 
if he were established within that State”.79 
The TV-10 case concerned a proceeding between a Luxembourg 
public limited company and the Commissariaat voor de Media (the 
supervisory body for broadcasting in the Netherlands). The Dutch 
authority argued that the TV-10 was established in Luxembourg in 
order to avoid the national rules of the Netherlands. The national 
Court of the Netherlands asked to the European Court of Justice 
whether a company, as TV-10, established into a EU Member State, 
wishing to provide services exclusively or almost exclusively into 
another EU Member State, could rely on article 59 of the Treaty. 
Moreover, the national Court asked to the ECJ whether a EU 
Member State could consider a corporation, as in the 
aforementioned example, as one of its national companies and, in 
this way, subject the corporation to its law. The European Court of 
Justice stated that a corporation, such that in the proceeding, could 
be equated to a national company. Thus, the ECJ decision prevents 
a corporation from establishing into another EU Member State in 
order to avoid national rules of the EU Member State of origin. 
Thanks to the Centros case was clarified that establish a corporation 
in a Member State in order to benefit of the less restrictive corporate 
law or the lower taxation does not correspond -per se- to an abuse 
of the European provisions.80 
                                       
79 Judgement of the Court, Case 3. 12. 1974 — Case 33/74 point (12) 
80 Judgement of the Court, Case 5. 10. 1994 — Case C-23/93; see also Judgement 
of the Court, Case 3. 12. 1974 — Case 33/74 and see also S. M. CARBONE, Brevi 
riflessioni sull’abuso del diritto comunitario: commercio internazionale ed esercizio 
delle libertà individuali, p. 71-75. 
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3.6 Überseering 
3.6.1 The Facts 
The Überseering case started with the litigation between the 
Überseering BV, a corporation formed accordingly the Netherlands 
law and registered on 22 August 1990, and the Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH (hereafter NCC). In October 1990, 
Überseering purchased a plot of land in Düsseldorf for carrying out 
its economic activity. In November 1992, NNC entered into a project-
management contract with Überseering with the task of refurbish a 
motel and a garage situated on that piece of land. NCC completed 
the restructuring operation, but Überseering claimed that the 
paintwork was defective. 81 
In December 1994, two German nationals residing in Düsseldorf 
decided to acquire all the shares in Überseering.82 Überseering tried 
without success to obtain a compensation from NCC because of the 
defective work. Thus in 1996 the corporation brought NCC before 
the German Regional Court, asking the reimbursement of DEM 1 
163 657.77, plus interest, in order to recover the costs incurred in 
remedying the claimed defects and consequential damage.83 
The German Regional Court rejected the action and then also the 
Higher Regional Court took the same decision. According to the 
German Courts Überseering, after the acquisition of the shares by 
German nationals, had transferred its real seat. Hence, the German 
Court stated that Überseering, having been incorporated in the 
Netherland and having its real seat in Germany, could not bring legal 
                                       
81 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (6). 
82 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (7). 
83 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (8). 
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proceeding in Germany because under the German law the 
corporation did not have the legal personality.84 
The proceedings was brought before the Bundesgerichtshof, which 
asked the European Court of Justice to make a preliminary ruling. 
The Bundesgerichtshof took the case law showed in the point 4 and 
585 of the judgement as starting point, and explained its point of view 
indicating that was preferable to continue on the path laid by the 
precedent case law for three main reasons.86  
The first reason showed by the Bundesgerichtshof recommended to 
use one governing law for corporation. This kind of solution would 
have the advantage to avoid the legal uncertainty.87 The second 
reason explained that the incorporation theory allows the 
entrepreneurs to choose the corporate law that suit them best. 
However, the incorporation theory do not consider the effect, on 
third parties and on the State where the place of administration is 
located, caused by the economic activity of the corporation, when 
the place of administration is located in a different State in respect 
to the State of incorporation.88 Finally, the German Courts, in the 
third reason, suggested that the application of the real seat theory 
does not allow the circumvention of certain vital interests, such as 
the interest of the creditors, the minority shareholders and finally 
the interest of the employees of the corporation.89 
                                       
84 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (9). 
85 The point 4 and 5 of the judgement explained that, According to the settled 
case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof, which is approved by most German legal 
commentators, German law apply the real seat theory. According to this theory 
the place were the centre of administration is located identifies the legal capacity 
of a corporation and the law that must be applied to it. 
86 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (12) and (13). 
87 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (14). 
88 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (15). 
89 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (16). 
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The Bundesgerichtshof underlined some point of the previous case 
law about Centros and Daily Mail which showed the uncertainty of 
the German Court concerning the Freedom of Establishment.90 
First, the Bundesgerichtshof asked to the European Court of Justice 
if articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community allow German authorities to deny the legal capacity to a 
corporation, and therefore the possibility for it to become party to an 
action, validly incorporated under a foreign corporate law of a EU 
Member State, because Germany adopts the real seat theory. 
Secondly, whether the EU provisions rule that the legal capacity and 
the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a company must be 
decided according to the law of the EU Member State where the 
company completed its incorporation.91 
In the observation submitted to the European Court of Justice the 
NCC, the German, Italian and Spanish Governments, firstly, based 
their thinking on the provisions of the Article 293 EC. According to 
the proposal sent to the Court, article 293 EC is based on the 
assumption, accepted by all the Members States, that a “company 
incorporated in one Member State does not automatically retain its 
legal personality in the event of its seat being transferred to another 
Member State and that it is necessary for the Member States to enter 
into a specific convention to that effect — a convention which has 
not as yet been adopted”. Thus, in the absence of an agreement on 
the mutual recognition of companies, it is possible, according to the 
EU provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment, for a 
corporation, which had transferred its real seat into another EU 
Member State, to lose its legal personality.92 
                                       
90 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (18) to (20). 
91 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (21). 
92 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (25) to (28). 
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Moreover, NCC and the German, Spanish and Italian Governments 
resumed the Daily Mail case to foster their point of view. The Daily 
Mail case concerned the connection existing between a company and 
the Member State where the company completed its incorporation. 
According to the NCC and the aforementioned Governments the 
reasoning applied by the European Court of Justice could be applied 
also in the Überseering case, where a company validly incorporated 
under the law of a Member State is deemed to have transferred its 
real seat into another Member State. In this situation the corporate 
law that should be applied to the corporation concerns the national 
law while the EU provisions on Freedom of Establishment are left 
out.93 
3.6.2 The Judgement of the ECJ 
The European Court of Justice started its findings rejecting the NCC 
and the German, Spanish and Italian Governments point of view. 
The Court stated that, in circumstances as those described in the 
previous paragraph, the Community Provision on Freedom of 
Establishment are relevant for the situation.94 
After this statement, the European Court of Justice moved on to 
explain why it rejected the reasoning of the NCC and the German, 
Spanish and Italian Governments based on the ground of article 293 
of the Treaty Establishing The European Community.95 
According to the Court: “Article 293 EC gives Member States the 
opportunity to enter into negotiations with a view, inter alia, to 
facilitating the resolution of problems arising from the discrepancies 
between the various laws relating to the mutual recognition of 
                                       
93 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (30). 
94 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (52). 
95 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (53). 
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companies and the retention of legal personality in the event of the 
transfer of their seat from one country to another”. Then, the 
European Court of Justice continued stating that even if no 
convention were concluded under the provision of the Treaty, the 
exercise of the Freedom of Establishment cannot be blocked by this 
inaction.96 
The European Court of Justice rejected also the argument presented 
by the NCC and the German, Spanish and Italian Governments 
founded on the Daily Mail case. The Court argued that the 
Überseering did not present any demand asking the transfer of its 
seat. Moreover, the Netherlands, the State of incorporation of 
Überseering, considered the corporation validly incorporated under 
its law, notwithstanding the fact that all the shares of the 
corporation passed under the control of persons resident in 
Germany. In fact, the Netherlands did not ask for the corporation 
winding-up.97 For this reasons, the Court concluded its reasoning 
affirming: “There are, therefore, no grounds for concluding from 
Daily Mail that, where a company formed in accordance with the law 
of one Member State and with legal personality in that State 
exercises its freedom of establishment in another Member State, the 
question of recognition of its legal capacity and its capacity to be a 
party to legal proceedings in the Member State of establishment falls 
outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment, even when the company is found, under the law of 
the Member State of establishment, to have moved its actual centre 
of administration to that State.”.98 
                                       
96 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (54), (55) and (57). 
97 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (65) to (72). 
98 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (73). 
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The European Court of Justice showed in detail the difference 
between the free movement of capital and the Freedom of 
Establishment. According to the Court, the community provisions 
on the free movement of capital rules the acquisition by one or more 
natural person residing in a Member State of shares of a company 
incorporated in another Member State; but the shareholding does 
not confer to the shareholder the power to control and manage the 
economic activity of the corporation. On the contrary, when the 
holding of the shares of the company by the natural persons confers 
to them the power to control and manage the economic activity of 
the corporation, the Community provisions about Freedom of 
Establishment should be applied.99 
The European Court of Justice decided that the refusal of standing 
before the national Courts, to a company validly incorporated under 
the law of another Member State and that have its registered office 
there, because the host Member State applies the Real Seat theory, 
is considered as a restriction of the Freedom of Establishment.100 
Finally the European Court of Justice recognised the importance of 
restriction to the Freedom of Establishment in order to prevent the 
general interest such as the protection of the interests of creditors, 
minority shareholders, employees and the taxation authorities. 
However, the endeavour to protect these interests cannot justify the 
refusal of the legal capacity to a corporation. According to the 
European Court of Justice the provisions of the Freedom of 
Establishment conferred, to the corporation validly incorporated 
under the law of a Member State, the capacity to be a party to legal 
proceedings.101 
                                       
99 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (77). 
100 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (82). 
101 Judgement of the Court, Case C-208/00, point (92) to (94). 
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3.6.3 Reaction to the judgement 
The Judgement of the European Court of Justice in the Überseering 
case law was particularly important because it clarified that articles 
293 EC should facilitate the attainment of Freedom of 
Establishment, but “the exercise of that freedom can none the less 
not be dependent upon the adoption of such conventions” 
encouraged by article 293 EC. Thus, corporations that satisfy the 
conditions set in by article 48 EC can benefit of the right of 
Establishment stated in articles 43 EC and 48 EC, which have been 
directly applicable since the ending of the transitional period. With 
the ruling of the Überseering case, it becomes clear that restrictions 
of the Freedom of Establishment are not allowed, in primis because 
the EU Member States did not adopt any convention on the mutual 
recognition of companies, which could justify such restrictions.  
The Überseering case shows how EU Member States did not yet 
resolve and understood the issues raised by the European Court of 
Justice in the Daily Mail case. The NCC and the German, Spanish 
and Italian Governments tried to foster their point of view through 
the Daily Mail case. However, the Überseering case was 
fundamentally different from Daily Mail, because the former was 
concerned with way in which the host EU Member State treats a 
company which is validly incorporated in another EU Member State 
and which is exercising its freedom of establishment in the host EU 
Member State. The European Court of Justice resumed its precedent 
ruling whereby: “a company, which is a creature of national law, 
exists only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its 
incorporation and functioning”. Thus, the national provisions of the 
host EU Member State could not deny the legal personality of a 
corporation validly formed into another EU Member State, if, 
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according to the LoBO of that State, the connecting link falls within 
those set forth in article 54 TFEU.  
Moreover, as noted above, in the Überseering case the issue 
identified in the Daily Mail case concerning the differences existing 
in the national legislation are not yet resolved by the European 
legislation or conventions. 
This decision of the triggered additional discussions among scholars 
concerning the future of the real seat theory. Some Authors argued 
that the decision took by the European Court of Justice had the 
effect of eliminating the application of the real seat theory by the 
remaining Member States. Other commentators took the position 
that the future decisions of the case law presented to the European 
Court of Justice concerning the choice of law issues, will be solved 
in favour of the Community and of the single market.102 
There is no doubt that the decision of the European Court of Justice 
deeply impacted German international corporate law and the 
international corporate law of other EU Member States applying the 
real seat theory. 
There were two main streams of interpretation of the judgement. The 
broad interpretation theorised that the Court decision abolished the 
real seat theory, while, at the same time, the Court embraced the 
incorporation doctrine. However, a narrower approach to the 
European Court of Justice decision, theorised that the European 
Court of Justice in Überseering involved just a modification to the 
real seat doctrine. Through this recognition theory modification of 
the European Court of Justice ensured that a corporation validly 
formed under the law of a EU Member State will obtain the legal 
recognition within all the EU Member States. The decision of the 
                                       
102 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.49. 
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European Court of Justice focused only on the recognition of the 
legal capacity of a foreign corporation, but the Court did not make 
any reference about which law, the law of the State of Incorporation 
or the law where the real seat of the corporation is located, should 
govern the corporation life.103 
Moreover, according to the opinion of Shanze and Jüttner, the 
Überseering case did not undermine the existence of the real seat 
theory; in their opinion the European Court of Justice decides only 
whether the application of the real seat theory could deny the legal 
personality to a validly formed corporation and registered into 
another Member State. Other authors affirmed that the decision of 
the European Court of Justice did note improve the condition of the 
European Internal Market, concerning only the validity of 
Überseering legal personality. In fact, the European Court of Justice 
argued: 
“Indeed, its very existence is inseparable from its status as a 
company incorporated under Netherlands law since, as the Court 
has observed, a company exists only by virtue of the national 
legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning (see, 
to that effect, Daily Mail and General Trust, paragraph 19).” 
In the judgement (point 81), the European Court of Justice never 
pointed out the prevalence of the incorporation theory over the real 
seat doctrine. What triggered the breach of the European provisions 
were some specific rules of the German company law, not the 
application of the recognition theory in its general terms.104 
                                       
103 ROTHE, N., Freedom Of Establishment Of Legal Persons Within The European 
Union: An Analysis Of The European Court Of Justice Decision In The Überseering 
Case, p.1134. 
104 PASCHALIDIS, P., Freedom of Establishment and Private intenational law for 
Corporation, p.51. 
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Thus, the European Court of Justice did not resolved (and it did not 
intend to resolve), the issue about which of the two recognition 
theories should prevail and be applied by the EU Member States. 
For this reason, the narrower interpretation of the decision of the 
European Court of Justice affirmed was correctly assuming that the 
real seat theory would be still compatible with the provisions 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment up to the point where its 
enforcement would lead to the denial of the legal capacity of a 
company correctly formed and operating according to the LoBO of 
its State of origin. 
The Überseering decision allows entrepreneurs to benefit of a wider 
choice of corporate laws within the European Union and fosters the 
mutual recognition of companies among EU Member States. Thanks 
to the judgement of the European Court of Justice, a company, 
formed accordingly a corporate law of one Member State, with its 
real seat placed into another Member State can benefit of its legal 
personality within all the EU Member States and can access to all 
local courts in order to enforce its own rights.  
The decision in the Überseering case makes more interesting to 
incorporate a company in one Member State, which is deemed to 
have the better corporate law for the corporation’s founding 
shareholders, while the company at the same time carries out its 
economic activity entirely in another EU Member State. Again (as in 
Centros and in other cases still to be discussed infra in this section) 
this assumption raises the doubt among scholars of a “race to the 
bottom”105 among the corporate laws of the EU Member States. 
                                       
105 The race to the bottom is a phenomenon that lead governments to deregulate 
their Law on Business Organizations or to reduce their fiscal imposition, in order 
to attract or retain corporations in their jurisdictions. Thus, this phenomenon, if 
not properly controlled, will lead to a damage for all the parties directly or 
indirectly related with the corporation. 
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However, some scholars thought that the judgement in the 
Überseering case could lead instead to a process of more intense 
harmonization among EU Member States.106 
On July 2001, while the judgement of the Überseering case was not 
yet released, the second chamber of the Bundesgerichtshof, the 
German Supreme Court, in order to preserve the German version of 
the real seat theory stated in Jersey case that a limited liability 
company formed under the law of the Channel Island of Jersey and 
having its real seat in Germany is considered by the German law not 
as a Jersey company but as a civil law partnership (Gesellschaft 
Bürgerlichen Rechts) or as a commercial partnership (Offene 
Handelsgesellschaft). These two kinds of firm have the possibility to 
stand before the national Courts, but their partners are personally 
liable for the debts of the partnership. This latter decision of the 
German Supreme Court was probably rendered on a wrong 
assumption, because the German Court thought that Jersey was 
part of the United Kingdom and therefore part of the European 
Union and could benefit of the provisions concerning the Freedom 
of Establishment.107 The decision of the Bundesgerichtshof was 
criticised because the Jersey rule did not respect the provision of the 
Freedom of Establishment making less attractive for the foreign 
corporation to exploit the Freedom of Establishment. The Jersey rule 
did not respect the four-factor test set forth in the Gebhart case. 108 
                                       
106 ROTHE, N., Freedom Of Establishment Of Legal Persons Within The European 
Union: An Analysis Of The European Court Of Justice Decision In The Überseering 
Case, p.1136. 
107 BGH, decision of 1. 7. 2002 - II ZR 380/00; see also http:// lexetius.com/2002, 
1515. 
108 EBKE, W. F., The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, 
Inspire Art and Beyond, International Legal Developments in Review: 2003  p.12-
15. 
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3.7 Inspire Art case 
3.7.1 The Facts 
The Inspire Art case concerned the application of the Wet op de 
Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen of 17 December 1997, a 
law on formally foreign companies, by Inspire Art Ltd (hereinafter 
WFBV), a company regularly formed under the LoBO of United 
Kingdom.109 
Article 1 of the WFBV identified as a “formally” foreign company a 
corporation or a company validly formed under a law, different from 
the law of the Netherlands, and with legal personality, which carries 
out its economic activity exclusively or almost exclusively in the 
Netherlands, and, finally, which does not hold any real connection 
with the State where it was formed accordingly with the law of that. 
Under Articles 2 to 5 of the WFBV the “formally” foreign companies 
were subject to various obligations concerning the company's 
registration in the commercial register, an indication of that status 
in all the documents produced by it (i.e. sent out in the course of its 
business activity), the minimum share capital and the drawing-up, 
production and publication of the annual (financial) documents. The 
corporations and companies not complying with the requirements 
stated by the WFBV were “punished” with the joint and several 
liability of its directors.110 
Inspire Art was, as noted, a limited liability company validly formed 
under the law of England and Wales, and its registered office was in 
Folkestone (UK). Inspire Art had a single director, whose domicile 
was in the Netherlands, more precisely in The Hague. The company 
director had the authorization to act alone and independently in the 
                                       
109 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (2). 
110 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (23). 
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name of the company. The corporation started its economic activity 
on 17 August 2000 through a branch located in Amsterdam under 
the name of Inspire Art Ltd. The corporation contrary to the 
provision stated in article 1 of the WFBV, was registered the 
commercial register of the Chamber of Commerce without indicating 
its status of “formally foreign company”.111 
On 30 October 2000 the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce asked 
to the local Court (Kantongerecht te Amsterdam), as mentioned in 
article 1 of the WFBV, to declare and then to file a registration 
amendment in the commercial register, that Inspire Art ltd was a 
“formally foreign company”. Inspire Art resisted to the argument of 
the Chamber of Commerce of the Netherlands, and thus the 
proceeding was suspended and the European Court of justice was 
asked to answer two questions.  
The European Court of Justice had to decide whether the provisions 
of the “Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen”, of 17 
December 1997, in particular those laid down in article 2 to 5 of the 
WFBV, did apply to the UK company in such case, and if those 
provisions did comply with or were contrary to the Community Law. 
The second question was to understand if the provisions of the 
WFBV were justified under the reason written in article 46 EC Treaty 
in force at that time. 
The Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German, Italian 
and Austrian Governments together were united to support the 
compliance of the WFBV provisions in respect to the articles 43 and 
48 of the EC Treaty. 
This pull of EU Member States argued that the rules applied by the 
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce were not contrary to the 
                                       
111 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (32), (34). 
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Freedom of Establishment, because they did not regard “neither the 
formation of companies under the law of another Member State nor 
their registration”. The enforcement of the WFBV did not hinder the 
recognition and the subsequent registration of the companies 
identified by the mentioned law. Thus, the Community provisions 
about the Freedom of Establishment had been respected. 
Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German, 
Italian and Austrian Governments considered irrelevant the Court’s 
holding in Centros, because that case concerned only the 
registration of foreign companies, while the Member States were still 
free to enforce such conditions for the carrying out of certain trades, 
professions or businesses, as they deemed necessary in their 
unfettered judgement. 
The Netherlands Government stated that its system of incorporation 
is “extremely liberal” for companies incorporated under the law of 
another Member State wishing to carry out an economic activity in 
the Netherlands. However this extremely liberal system of law 
created an unexpected consequence. In the Netherlands even more 
companies were formed abroad, while carrying out principally or 
exclusively their economic activity in the Netherlands with the aim 
of avoiding the mandatory provisions of the corporate law of the 
Netherlands.112 
According to the Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, 
German, Italian and Austrian Governments the provisions of the 
WFBV forced companies formed under a law of a another EU 
Member State to comply with additional requirements, while they 
carry out their economic activity in the Netherlands. The task of this 
additional obligations is to ensure that third parties and other 
                                       
112 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (77), (78) and (79). 
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company’s stakeholders are conscious that the legal entities  
identified by the WFBV law were formally foreign companies and, 
moreover, the aim was to ensure third parties subscribing contracts 
with the formally foreign corporations, the same guarantees that 
they had subscribing contracts with Dutch companies. Hence, the 
opinion of the Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German, 
Italian and Austrian Governments was that the conditions imposed 
by law of the Netherlands aimed to protect consumers and creditors 
and that these rules were to be respected both by Dutch and foreign 
companies.113 
The Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German and 
Austrian Governments continued their analysis referring to the 
judgment of the Daily Mail case. They started their thought on the 
words wrote by the European Court of Justice in the Daily mail case 
in which the Court held that articles 43 EC and 48 EC allow Member 
States to determine the relevant factor connecting a company to 
their national legal order. Thus, the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Netherlands, German and Austrian Governments continued their 
assumption arguing that the Community provision allows adopting, 
under private international law, rules to be applied to companies 
that fall partly within the scope of Netherlands law. Hence, the 
WFBV considered, as connecting factors, not only the place of  
incorporation, but also the place where the company carries out its 
business.114 
The Inspire Art, the United Kingdom Government and the 
Commission affirmed that the provisions of the WFBV would have 
foreclosed the complete functioning of the rules under articles 43 EC 
and 48 EC, concerning the Freedom of Establishment. From its point 
                                       
113 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (81), (82). 
114 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (83). 
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of view the Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen 
imposed to comply with obligations which have the result to render 
the Freedom of Establishment less attractive for companies formed 
under the law of another Member State and intending to carry on 
entirely or almost entirely their activities in the Netherlands. 
According to the Inspire Art, the United Kingdom Government and 
the Commission the Community provisions concerning Freedom of 
Estblishment allow entrepreneurs to form companies in one Member 
State with the only purpose to establish the company into another 
Member State where they decide to carry out their entire economic 
activity. In fact, the European Court of Justice in the Centros and 
Sergers cases stated that forming a company in one Member State 
and then establishing the company into another Member State 
where the main business is entirely carried out is not an abuse of 
the provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. According 
to the Court, this kind of operation does not constitute an abuse of 
the Community rules even if made with the unique purpose to avoid 
the stricter corporate law of the host Member State.115 
3.7.2 The Judgement of the ECJ 
The European Court of Justice started its judgement stating, 
according to its previous judgements in Segers (point 16) and 
Centros (point 17), that the Freedom of Establishment allows a 
company formed in one Member State to establish itself into another 
Member State with the only purpose to carry out its entire economic 
activity therein. Only in the event of fraud became relevant to 
investigate the reasons why a company decided to be formed in a 
particular Member State.116 
                                       
115 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (91). 
116 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (95). 
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The European Court of Justice reaffirmed117 that the fact that if a 
company was formed in a particular Member State in order to enjoy 
of the benefit arising from a more suitable legislation does not 
constitute abuse of the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment, even if that corporation carries out its economic 
activity entirely or mainly in that second State. 
According to the European Court of Justice the WFBV impedes the 
complete functioning of the right of Establishment of companies, 
because the application of the WFBV  rules to a branch of a company 
formed in anther EU Member State, in particular the provisions 
concerning the minimum capital and the liability of the directors, 
influences the Community rules.118 
The European Court of Justice remembered again that the Daily Mail 
case concerned the relations “between a company and the Member 
State under the laws of which it had been incorporated in a situation 
where the company wished to transfer its actual centre of 
administration to another Member State whilst retaining its legal 
personality in the State of incorporation.”.119 
Thus, according to the Court, articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty do 
not allow the provisions on minimum capital requirements and 
unlimited liability of the directors of the company, as they were 
provided for under the WFBV, which consequently constitutes a 
restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment of “formally foreign 
companies” such as Inspire Art Ltd.120 
The Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German and 
Austrian Governments argued that the provisions of the WFBV, 
                                       
117 Judgement of the Court in Segers, point (16), and in Centros, point (18). 
118 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (101). 
119 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (103). 
120 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (104). 
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concerning the directors' liability and the minimum capital 
requirements, are necessary “to counter fraud, protect creditors and 
ensure that tax inspections are effective and that business dealings 
are fair”. According to their point of view, these rules are admissible 
both by article 46 of the EC Treaty and by overriding reasons of 
public interest.121 They further specified that these rules concerning 
the minimum capital requirements provided the protection to all 
creditors against the risk of fraudulent insolvency, because the 
formally foreign corporations are usually formed with insufficient 
corporate capital. The minimum capital requirements were also 
justified by the Chamber of Commerce because they hindered the 
fraudulent or risky behaviour by companies that do not have real 
connection with the State of incorporation.122 
The European Court of Justice answered to these arguments stating 
that the article 46 EC does not cover the protection of creditors, the 
fight against improper recourse to freedom of establishment, and the 
protection of both effective tax inspections and fairness in business 
dealings. Thus, the Court had to analyse these arguments bearing 
in mind just the possible overriding reasons of public interest. 
However, the European Court of Justice resumed its former 
judgements in the previous case law and pinpointed again that 
“national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must, if 
they are to be justified, fulfil four conditions: they must be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the public interest; they must be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and 
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”. 
                                       
121 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (109). 
122 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (117). 
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The European Court of Justice stated that Inspire Art ltd presented 
itself as an England and Wales company. Thus, for the creditors of 
the corporation it was clear that the matters of the minimum capital 
requirements and the liability of its directors were governed by the 
law of England and Wales. In addition, it did not constitute a 
sufficient proof of the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct of 
the Community provisions the formation of a company in one 
Member State, where it does not carry out any economic activity, in 
order to establish a branch into another Member State, where for 
the company the corporate law is more suitable and where the 
company decides to conduct its entire business activity. For that 
reason, the Members State could not deny the corporation to benefit 
from the Community law.123 
Finally, for the European Court of Justice, neither the Chamber of 
Commerce nor the Netherlands Government, on the matter of 
fairness in business dealings and the efficiency of tax inspections124, 
provided to the European Court of Justice the necessary proofs to 
demonstrate that the rules of the WFBV satisfy the criteria of the 
Gebhard test125.  
The European Court of Justice concluded its decision stating that 
articles 46 EC, the protection of creditors, the combat of abuse of 
Community law, the guarantee of fairness in business dealings and 
the efficiency of tax inspection do not justify restriction of the 
Freedom of Establishment on the basis of a national law, such as 
the WFBV.126 
                                       
123 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (135) and point (137). 
124 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (140). 
125 The three criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non-discrimination. 
126 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (142). 
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3.7.3 Reaction to the Inspire Art Judgement 
In the Inspire Art case law the European Court of Justice have to 
rule on the compatibility of a national law with the right of 
Establishment. The Court through its ruling stressed some of its 
precedents ruling made in the Centros and Überseering cases. The 
Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German and Austrian 
Governments based their thought on the precedent ECJ’s 
statements in the Daily Mail case. However, their thoughts were 
deemed wrong, because these parties overestimated the similarities 
between these two cases. 
Thus, The European Court of Justice had to clarify to the parties 
that Daily Mail was concerned only with the relationship between a 
company and the Member State under the laws of which it had been 
incorporated. In fact, in Daily mail the company wished to transfer 
its actual centre of administration to another Member State whilst 
retaining its legal personality in the United Kingdom, i.e. the EU 
Member State of incorporation (and UK adopts the incorporation 
theory). Through this ruling, it started to become evident that the 
EU Member State of incorporation has more power to discipline the 
transfer of its national companies, whereas the host EU Member 
State has a narrower scope to govern the Establishment of the 
corporation of the other EU Member States. In fact, the host EU 
Member State has to justify those provisions that would effectively 
restrict the Freedom of Establishment of a foreign company, on the 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health: each and 
every provision must comply with the four factors of the Gebhard 
test.  
The European Court of Justice in the Inspire Art case had to explain 
again that the right of Establishment conferred to the EU 
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corporations consists in the possibility for them to be formed in one 
Member State and to establish themselves into another Member 
State with the only purpose to carry out their entire economic 
activity therein. The Court specified that the corporations are free to 
choose the corporate law under which to be incorporated according 
to their needs and preferences. This operation does not constitute 
an abuse of the right of Establishment per se. Thus, corporations 
validly formed under the law of an EU Member State are entitled to 
establish a branch into anther EU Member State in order to pursue 
their economic activity. The necessary connecting factor with the 
specific EU Member State is to be identified by one of the following: 
the place of the company registered office, the central administration 
and the principal place of business. Even if this ruling was not new 
in the European jurisprudence, it helped the EU Member States to 
better understand the scope of the abuse of the European Freedom 
of Establishment. 
The European Court of Justice, in the Inspire Art case, was called to 
face again the problems of EU law compliance arising between the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment and national 
rules. Already the previous decisions of the European Court of 
Justice in Centros, Daily Mail and Überseering created, among 
scholars, an academic debate if the real seat theory was able, 
possibly with the necessary modifications, to coexist with the 
Freedom of Establishment, or not. 
The judgement of the European Court of Justice in Inspire Art 
reinforced the opinion among scholars that the real seat doctrine 
could coexist with the Community provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment. In fact, the real seat theory found itself 
narrowed by the last judgement of the European Court of Justice 
but it was not abolished by the decision of the Court, therefore 
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Article 54 TFUE still guarantees the real seat theory applicability 
within the EU Member States. 
A comparative analysis of Daily Mail case and Inspire Art case shows 
that the scope of applicability of the real seat theory depends on the 
role assumed by the EU Member State which applies the 
aforementioned doctrine. With regard to Freedom of Establishment, 
the State of Incorporation has a wider scope in applying its corporate 
law whereas the host Member State, due to the disparate judgement 
of the European Court of Justice, has a narrowed scope in applying 
its corporate law. 
The Chamber of Commerce and the Netherlands, German and 
Austrian Governments tried to justify the WFBV on the ground of 
the creditors’ protection. However, the European Court of Justice 
rejected the argument of the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Netherlands, German and Austrian Governments. Such a decision 
of the European Court of Justice lead the scholars to the point of 
view that Member States have to change their approach to the 
protection of creditors and in general of stakeholders.127 The 
Member States could empower their measures concerning the 
protection of the creditors and other stakeholders focusing on better 
information and financial disclosure made by the corporations. 
The opinion of the Advocate General Alber pointed out the 
uncertainty that hovered among the Governments of Member States. 
This happened especially when the representative of the German 
Governments asked during the oral hearing to the European Court 
of Justice the possible way to hinder the creation of the “brass plate 
companies” (companies with no “real” existence other than a brass 
nameplate at its registered address) that were considered to abuse 
                                       
127 EBKE, W. F., The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, 
Inspire Art and Beyond, International Legal Developments in Review: 2003,  p. 47. 
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the Community provisions on Freedom of Establishment. The AG 
Alber argued that it is not a duty of the European Court of Justice 
to find an answer to this kind of questions. According to the opinion 
of the Advocate General, the Member States must find the solution 
necessary to prevent any type of abuse made by the corporations. 
The AG Alber explained that the European Court of Justice, under 
article 220 EC, is able to interpret the provisions of the Treaty. Thus, 
the Court has to identify the scope given to the provisions contained 
within the European Treates. 128 
Some scholars after the decision of the European Court of Justice in 
Inspire Art case resumed the precedent decision of the Court in 
Überseering. They noted that the Court in point 92 of that judgment 
held: “It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to 
the general interest, such as the protection of the interests of 
creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation 
authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment”. Thus, 
in Inspire Art case the European Court of Justice makes impossible 
to benefit of the statement part of the judgement of Überseering 
case.129 In fact, the European Court of Justice stated that a 
restriction to the right of Establishment derived by a domestic 
provision, such as those of the proceeding, concerning the minimum 
capital requirements and the liability of directors, cannot be justified 
on the ground of the protection of creditors.130 
 
                                       
128 Opinion of the Advocate General Alber, Inspire Art case, point (122) and (123). 
129 KERSTING, C., SCHINDLER, C. P., The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its Effects on Practice, p. 1284. 
130 Judgement of the Court, Case C-167/01 point (142). 
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About the issue of protecting corporate creditors, the European 
Court of Justice affirmed that the Inspire Art shows itself as a 
company governed by different corporate laws; in particular, Inspire 
Art appeared governed by both the law of England and Wales and 
that of the Netherlands. Thus, the creditors of the corporation were 
sufficiently informed that the corporation was subject to different 
rules concerning the minimum capital and directors' liability. 
Some authors made a drastic example to demonstrate that the point 
of view of the European Court of Justice could not be totally correct. 
They took as an example the corporate laws of Austria and Germany. 
The Austrian private limited companies, according to Section 6 (1) 
of the Austrian law on private limited companies, are required to 
have a minimum capital of Euro 35.000, whereas the German 
private limited corporations, according to Section 5 (1) of the 
German law on private limited companies, required Euro 25.000 as 
minimum capital. Both in Austria and in Germany the private 
limited corporations use the acronym GmbHG to show their legal 
form. Thus, there is no certainty that a creditor of one of these two 
Member States is in fact enabled to understand the origin of a 
corporation. Finally, some scholars stated that the arguments of the 
European Court of Justice concerning the transparency of the 
market could work with regard to contractual creditors, but should 
not be applied with regard to the tort creditors.131 
Finally, scholars and jurist, after the judgement of the European 
Court of Justice, started to study the possible consequences of the 
restrictions of the right of Establishment based on the protection of 
the interest of the employees. 
                                       
131 KERSTING, C., SCHINDLER, C. P., The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its Effects on Practice, p. 1284. 
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The protection of the employees’ rights, especially if they affect 
constitutional values, could allow Member State to restrict the 
Freedom of Establishment. For instance, the German law apply the 
co-determination132 rules for companies having certain 
characteristics. It was not clear whether an host EU Member State 
has the power to apply its provisions, such as the representation of 
labor on the board, to a corporation validly formed into another EU 
Member State but that carry out most or the entire part of its 
economic activity in the host EU Member State. 
Some Scholars argued that German law about the co-determination 
could justify, restrictions to Freedom of Establishment. However, 
there were many doubts on the applicability of this rule to the 
pseudo-foreign companies, because with high probability the co-
determination rule does not meet the four-factor test developed by 
the European Court of Justice and this rule does not fall within the 
scope of article 46 EC.133The rule on co-determination can be 
applied both to pseudo-foreign and to national companies, therefore 
it is considered as non-discriminatory. In any case, the issues, as 
the representation of foreign employees, the remodelling of the 
governance structure of the real foreign corporation to the co-
determination rule and the recognition of the co-determination rule 
                                       
132 Codetermination in Germany is a concept with a solid history that involves the 
right of workers to participate in management of the companies they work for. 
Known as Mitbestimmung, the modern law on codetermination is found 
principally in the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976. The law allows workers to elect 
representatives for almost half of the supervisory board of directors. The 
legislation is applied to public and private companies, so long as there are over 
2000 employees. For companies with 500-2000 employees, one third of the 
supervisory board must be elected. 
133 EBKE, W. F., The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Überseering, 
Inspire Art and Beyond, p. 32-33. 
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by the EC Member State of incorporation, are not considered 
because real foreign corporation are left out from this problem.134  
However, the application of the German co-determination rule to the 
pseudo-foreign corporations could possibly be considered as a 
restriction of the article 43 EC and 48 EC concerning the Freedom 
of Establishment. This because the application of the German rule 
about the compulsory participation of the employees to the 
management of the pseudo-foreign companies makes the right of 
establishment less attractive and hinders the Freedom of 
Establishment. Moreover, it is important also to consider if the co-
determination rule does not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain its objective and, therefore, it complies with the requirement 
of proportionality. The authors argued that the Directive on the 
European Works Council guarantees a minimum level of protection 
to the employees. They also noted that the co-determination in the 
other EU Member States is not considered necessary to protect 
employees interests. Finally, the argument of the European Court of 
Justice based on the information, as in Inspire Art case, is applicable 
also when employees enter into a contract with the pseudo-foreign 
corporation. In fact, employees are aware that the company is 
subject to the corporate law of another EU Member State and 
therefore they can be considered protected. Thus, the application 
from the host State of its corporate law to a pseudo foreign 
corporation might be considered as a breach of the Freedom of 
Establishment.135 
                                       
134 KERSTING, C., SCHINDLER, C. P., The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its Effects on Practice, p. 1286. 
135 KERSTING, C., SCHINDLER, C. P., The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
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3.8 Sevic 
3.8.1 The Facts 
The Sevic case concerned the corporate mobility. Sevic System was 
a German company which in 2002 concluded a merger agreement 
with a Luxemburgish corporation called Security Vision (SVC). The 
merger agreement caused SVC dissolution without liquidation and 
the transfer of all its assets to Sevic System. However, the 
Amtsgericht Neuwied, the local court, refused the application for 
registration of the merger in the commercial register because in its 
opinion the article 1 paragraph 1 of the Umwandlungsgesetz 
(UmwG) did not allow mergers between legal entities that were not 
established in Germany. 
At the proceeding time, the European institution had not completed 
the Cross-Border Merger Directive. Thus, there was not any 
European law enforced that ruled the operation. In fact, the 
Advocate General Antonio Tizzano in his opinion specified that the 
European Commission tried, for many years, to enforce some 
provisions in order to provide to the Member States an European law 
able to rule cross-border mergers.136  
Sevic Systyem was contrary to the  local court decision and appealed 
it with the Landgericht Koblenz which asked to the European Court 
of Justice an interpretation of the Community law. The question 
submitted to the European Court of Justice asked for the 
compatibility of the German provisions, the Umwandlungsgesetz, 
concerning the mergers of the corporations with articles 43 EC and 
48 EC. 
                                       
136 Opinion of Mr Tizzano — Case C-411/03 point (7) and (8). 
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3.8.2 The Judgement of the European Court of Justice 
According to the point of view of the Advocate General Tizzano, the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment allowed legal 
persons to access and carry out an economic activity into another 
Member State in the same manner, and under the same conditions, 
as the legal persons of the host Member State. Thus, articles 43 and 
48 of the EC Treaty do not just allow legal persons to move into 
another Member State in order to carry out an economic activity 
there, but, moreover, they afford the right of establishment together 
with all the functional and complemental aspects, which are linked 
to the corporation’s economic activity.137 According to professor 
Tizzano, the national provisions concerned aspects that are not 
complementary but essential to the carrying out of the corporation 
economic activity. 
Moreover the Advocate General Antonio Tizzano, underlined that the 
intention of the Sevic System corporation was to maintain in 
Luxembourg, after the merger of the two companies, assets, 
personnel and means of production belonging to the incorporated 
company, the SVC. In this way the Sevic case could be considered 
and studied not only as a case concerning the primary Freedom of 
Establishment, but also as a case of secondary Freedom of 
Establishment, due to the fact that Sevic System wanted, by the 
merger, establish a secondary place of business abroad.138 
The Advocate General considered the precedent judgement of the 
European Court of Justice that affirmed: “all measures which 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that 
freedom” must be considered as restriction to the Community law 
                                       
137 Opinion of Mr Tizzano — Case C-411/03 point (29) and foll. 
138 Opinion of Mr Tizzano — Case C-411/03 point (34) and foll. 
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concerning the Freedom of Establishment. Thus, national measures 
which hinder or discourage the application of provisions concerning 
the Freedom of Establishment are prohibited, due to the Community 
rules and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Thus, 
Tizzano concluded his opinion arguing that the German UmwG rules 
hinder the right concerning the Freedom of Establishment blocking 
both German companies to establish themselves in other EU 
Member States and companies of other EU Member States to access 
the German market by means of mergers.139 
The European Court of Justice started its judgement stating that 
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC can be used to discipline a merger such 
as the merger of the Sevic case. The European Court of Justice 
confirmed the point of view of the Advocate General Antonio Tizzano 
stating that: “a merger such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
constitutes an effective means of transforming companies in that it 
makes it possible, within the framework of a single operation, to 
pursue a particular activity in new forms and without intrerruption, 
thereby reducing the complications, times and costs associated with 
other forms of company consolidation such as those which entail, 
for example, the dissolution of a company with liquidation of assets 
and the subsequent formation of a new company with the transfer 
of assets to the latter.”.140 
The European Court of Justice concluded its reasoning arguing: 
“Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude registration in the national 
commercial register of the merger by dissolution without liquidation 
of one company and transfer of the whole of its assets to another 
company from being refused in general in a Member State where one 
of the two companies is established in another Member State, 
                                       
139 Opinion of Mr Tizzano — Case C-411/03 point (44) and (50). 
140 Judgment of the Court, Case C-411/03 point (16) and (21). 
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whereas such registration is possible, on compliance with certain 
conditions, where the two companies participating in the merger are 
both established in the territory of the first Member State.”.141 
3.8.3 The consequences of the ECJ judgement 
The ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Sevic case clarified 
that the provision concerning the Freedom of Establishment “covers 
all measures which permit or even merely facilitate access to another 
Member State and the pursuit of an economic activity in that State 
by allowing the persons concerned to participate in the economic life 
of the country effectively and under the same conditions as national 
operators”. These ruling confirmed the point of view of Advocate 
General Tizzano and identified in a general way the boundaries of 
the right of Establishment. Thus, the cross-border merger between 
two companies governed by different corporate laws fall within the 
scope of the right of Establishment. 
The European Court of Justice decision resumed its precedent 
ruling which stated “it is not possible to exclude the possibility that 
imperative reasons in the public interest such as protection of the 
interests of creditors, minority shareholders and employees, and the 
preservation of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the 
fairness of commercial transactions, may, in certain circumstances 
and under certain conditions, justify a measure restricting the 
freedom of establishment”. EU Member States can apply restrictions 
to the right of Establishment, but these restrictions must justify 
under the grounds noted by article 52 TFEU or respect the 
conditions set out by the Gebhard test. 
                                       
141 Judgment of the Court, Case C-411/03 point (31). 
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3.9 Cartesio 
3.9.1 The Facts 
Cartesio was a Hungarian limited partnership formed on 
20 May 2004. On 11 November 2005, Cartesio filed a transfer 
request with  the Bács-Kiskun Megy Bíróság, the Regional Court of 
Bács-Kiskun, whereby its real seat would have been moved to 
Gallarate (Italy), whereas, at the same time, the company asked to 
maintain its status as a company subject to the Hungarian law. 
Hungary adopts the real seat theory and its corporate law states that 
the operational headquarters and the registered office of a 
corporation must be placed in the same state, therefore, on 24 
January 2006, the application for the transfer of Cartesio seat was 
rejected because that the Hungarian law did not allow a corporation 
incorporated under the Hungarian law to transfer its seat into 
another State, at the same time remaining subject to the Hungarian 
law. According to the Hungarian law, a corporation, in order to be 
allowed to such an operation, should first go through dissolution 
and winding-up of its business and then re-incorporate in another 
jurisdiction. 
The Hungarian Regional Court of Appeals decided to stay the 
proceeding while waiting for an answer to the four questions posed 
to the European Court of Justice. Three questions concerned the 
power of the Regional Court to submit such a reference under article 
234 EC and one question concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
In addition, the Regional Court asked whether articles 43 and 48 of 
the EC Treaty allowed for national rules to impede the transfer of the 
seat of a corporation into another State, unless prior dissolution of 
the local entity was completed (prior dissolution rule). 
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The Advocate General Poiares Maduro argued that the Cartesio case 
did not fall outside the scope of the Community provisions 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment. In the opinion of the 
Advocate General, national provisions permitting a corporation to 
transfer its administrative headquarters only within its national 
borders “treat cross-border situations less favourably than purely 
national situations.”. Thus, these national corporate law provisions 
appear to discriminate the exercise of the fundamental freedom of 
establishment. Moreover, he argued that Cartesio wanted to carry 
on an economic activity for an indefinite period of time and through 
a stable establishment in Italy. Therefore, the European Treaty 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment should be 
applied.142 
The Advocate General resumed the previous statement of the 
European Court of Justice expressed in the Daily Mail case, where 
the Court acknowledged the power of a EU Member State to decide 
on “life and death” of a corporation formed under its corporate law. 
However, the Advocate General argued that the European Court of 
Justice in its judgement on the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art 
cases, took a different conclusion with regard to the decision it took 
in Daily Mail. Prof. Maduro acknowledged and fostered the reasoning 
of Advocate General Tizzano in his opinion concerning the Sevic 
case. Tizzano had affirmed in his opinion that : “It is evident from 
the case law that Article 43 [of the] EC [Treaty] does not merely 
prohibit a Member State from impeding or restricting the 
establishment of foreign operators in its territory, it also precludes 
it from hindering the establishment of national operators in another 
Member State. In other words, restrictions “on entering” or “on 
                                       
142 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C‑210/06, p. (25). 
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leaving” national territory are prohibited” under the Freedom of 
Establishment rules. 
Thus, Maduro rejected the opinion that EU Member States are free 
to determine “life and death” of a corporation formed under their 
corporate law, because the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment influenced the corporate law of any EU Member 
State. The Advocate General further underlined the importance of 
the primary right of Establishment for small and medium-sized 
corporations, because for such companies “an intra-Community 
transfer of operational headquarters may be a simple and effective 
form of taking up genuine economic activities in another Member 
State without having to face the costs and the administrative 
burdens inherent in first having to wind up the company in its 
country of origin and then having to resurrect it completely in the 
Member State of destination”. According to the Advocate General 
point of view, the winding-up of a corporation and its subsequent 
incorporation into another EU Member State represents for it a huge 
expense of time and resources. 
The Advocate General Maduro took the view that the Treaty allowed 
State law restrictions on Freedom of Establishment on the grounds 
of general public interest143. However, the Hungarian Government 
did not submit any public interest justifications. Moreover, the 
Hungarian law did not provide any possibility for a corporation 
formed under its corporate law to transfer its operational 
headquarters into another EU Member State. The only way for a 
corporation was to first wind-up and, then, to reincorporate in the 
selected EU Member State; the Hungarian law did not provide any 
                                       
143 An example could be the prevention of abuse or fraudulent conduct, the 
protection of the interests of, creditors, minority shareholders, employees or the 
tax authorities. 
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other condition for a corporation formed under its corporate law for 
such an operation. Thus, in the light of all these considerations, the 
Advocate General suggested to the European Court of Justice to 
consider the Hungarian provisions not compatible with the 
provisions stated in Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
3.9.2 The Judgement of the ECJ 
The European Court of Justice in Cartesio maintained the previous 
holding, as expressed twenty years before in the Daily Mail case. The 
European Court of Justice concluded its ruling stating that, at the 
present status of the Community law, Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty allowed the corporate law of a Member State, where a 
corporation decided to be originally incorporated, to prohibit such 
corporation to transfer its seat into another EU Member State, while 
at the same time retaining its status as a corporation subject and 
governed by the corporate law of the EU Member State of 
incorporation.144 
In reaching such conclusion, the Court resumed its ruling where it 
affirmed that companies are creatures of national law and they exist 
only by virtue of the national legislation which determines its 
incorporation and functioning rules.145 The European Court of 
Justice again pinpointed, in its decision, the equivalence of the three 
connecting factors of the registered office, central administration 
and principal place of business of a company identified by Article 43 
and 48 of the EC Treaty, today article 49 and 54 of the TFEU. 
In Cartesio, point 108, the European Court of Justice explained that 
the EEC Treaty considered the differences existing within the 
corporate laws of the EU Member States. These legal differences 
                                       
144 Judgment of the Court, Case C-210/06, point (124). 
145 Judgment of the Court, Case 81/87 point (19). 
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among EU Member States concerned inter alia, the connecting 
factors required by corporations formed under their respective 
corporate law and the difference existing between rules concerning 
the transfer of real seat or of registered seat from the EU Member 
State of incorporation and another EU Member State were the real 
seat or the registered seat is to be transferred. For the Court this 
kind of problems should be solved by future legislation and 
conventions and it cannot be determined by the provisions on the 
right of establishment provided by the Community law, as the Court 
already stated in the Daily Mail case.146 
Moreover, according to the Court, each EU Member State retains the 
power to choose the connecting factor(s) necessary for a corporation 
to be considered validly formed under its corporate law and the 
connecting factors allowing the corporation to retain its status as a 
“national” company. Thus, such a power would enable a EU Member 
State to deny a corporation subject to its corporate law to transfer 
its seat into another EU Member State, without prior dissolution. 
After clarifying the connecting factors’ scope and the EU Member 
States right to determine them, the Court specified that a situation 
such as that occurring in Cartesio case should be considered 
differently in comparison to a situation in which a corporation 
validly established in one Member State decides to transfer its seat 
with an application asking the change of the applicable national 
law.147 In such a case, the corporation decides to convert itself into 
a form of company disciplined by the corporate law of the host EU 
Member State. The European Court of Justice specified that, in this 
kind of situations, the requirement of winding-up or liquidation of 
the corporation will be considered as a restriction of the Freedom of 
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Establishment, thus such type of restriction must be justified by the 
Gebhard test.148 
The Commission underlined that the differences among corporate 
laws of EU Member States, in particular those concerning the 
connecting factors and the transfer of seat, were solved by the EU 
legislation concerning the transfer of seat, from one EU Member 
State to another EU Member State, by the regulation about the SE 
and the European Cooperative Society (SCE) and the European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG).149 
These regulations permit legal entities established in one EU 
Member State to transfer their registered office, and thus also their 
real seat, into another EU Member State without “it being 
compulsory to wind up the original legal person or to create a new 
legal person”. However, this kind of operations involves a change of 
the national law applicable to the corporation that wants to transfer 
its seat.150 
However, the European Court of Justice pointed that, in the present 
case, Cartesio wanted to transfer its real seat from Hungary to Italy, 
while at the same time remaining a company governed by Hungarian 
law: hence, such operation would not have involved any change in 
the national law applicable to the corporation.151 
Finally, the Court specified that the Sevic case was different from the 
Cartesio case, because the case of Sevic System concerned the 
recognition by the EU Member State of incorporation of an 
establishment of the corporation into anther EU Member State by 
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the operation of a cross-border merger. Therefore, from the 
European Court of Justice point of view the two cases were 
fundamentally different.152 
3.9.3 Considerations on the Judgement of the ECJ 
The Cartesio case is considered a milestone of the Freedom of 
Establishment issue. The Cartesio case influenced and marked the 
boundaries of important right of Establishment features for 
companies. In fact, the case permitted to better analyse the 
outbound and the inbound cases and it apparently solved the issue 
concerning the real seat theory compatibility with the provisions of 
the Freedom of Establishment; it finally confirmed and specified the 
controversial rules stated by the European Court of Justice in the 
Daily Mail case. 
The European Court of Justice introduced in its decision another 
important issue: in two points of the Cartesio’s judgement, the 
European Court of Justice introduced the notion of “nationality” 
referred to the corporations. This is important, because the Court in 
the previous judgements argued: “unlike natural persons, 
companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of 
Community law, creatures of national law.”153 
Überseering and Inspire Art decisions narrowed and outlined the 
Daily Mail case as a case concerning only the outbound corporate 
mobility. A.G. Tizzano and A.G. Maduro expressed the opinion that 
the Daily Mail decision ought to be repealed because, at the present 
state of the European law, the Daily Mail ruling allowed some 
unacceptable behaviours by EU Member States which hindered the 
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transfer to other States of corporations formed under their corporate 
laws. 
In Cartesio case, the European Court of Justice confirmed its 
previous Daily Mail decision, and stated again that “companies are 
creatures of national law and exist only by virtue of the national 
legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning”. 
Then, the European Court of Justice specified that the Überseering 
case shows that the corporate law of an EU Member State of 
incorporation provides legal personality to the corporation. Thus, it 
will be the corporate law of the EU Member State of incorporation to 
decide the necessary requirements for a corporation aiming to 
transfer its seat into another EU Member State without losing at the 
same time its legal personality. Moreover, any restriction on this 
kind of movement must comply with the conditions outlined in the 
Gebhard case (i.e. “they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment 
of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it”154). 
A joint analysis of the Cartesio case, together with the Überseering 
case, shows that the European Court of Justice studied the private 
international law provisions of the EU Member State where the 
corporation was formed. Any corporation seeking to benefit of the 
right of Establishment within the European Union must comply with 
the requirements written in article 54 TFUE. More precisely, the 
corporation must be formed accordingly under the corporate law of 
any of EU Member States, and then it must have its registered office, 
central administration or its principal place of business within the 
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Union. None of these three connecting links shall be considered as 
prevailing with respect to the others. 
It appears that the European Court of Justice would be willing to 
examine the private international law provisions of each EU Member 
State that is involved in a proceeding in order to determine which 
EU Member State complies with the provisions of article 54 of the 
TFEU whenever there is uncertainty about the nationality or the 
legal personality of a corporation. Thus, when the European Court 
of Justice faced the issues raised by the Cartesio case, it examined 
the connective link between the corporation and the Italian law. 
Since in the specific circumstances of the case there were no 
connecting factors between the Italian law and Cartesio, the 
nationality and the legal personality of the corporation could not be 
established in Italy. In fact, the company had its real seat and also 
its registered seat in Hungary, since it was formed and registered 
under the Hungarian law. In the Überseering case the corporation 
was formed under the Dutch law, whereas it was considered to have 
moved its administrative seat in Germany from a German law 
perspective. However, since the corporation was not incorporated 
under the German law, this circumstance permitted to the European 
Court of Justice to identify a restriction on the Freedom of 
Establishment in German corporate law. The European Court of 
Justice decisions in these cases and the previous decisions show 
that the State of incorporation retains a greater power in 
determining the life of the corporations formed under its corporate 
law. 
It could also be noted that it appears that the European Court of 
Justice in its statement took the opportunity to give an indication 
about the transfer of the registered seat. In fact, the Court stated 
that, according to the point of view of the Commission, if Cartesio 
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had tried to move first its registered seat probably the regulation 
concerning the EEIG and SE could have been used in order to 
discipline this kind of operation.155 
3.9.3. a A deeper focus on the emigration and immigration cases 
The previous decisions of the European Court of Justice concerning 
the Freedom of Establishment and the Court’s judgement in Cartesio 
provide a better understanding of the differences existing between 
an “emigration” and an “immigration” case law, concerning 
companies (as defined under article 49 and 54 of TFEU). 
Centros, Überseering, Inspire Art cases can be considered as 
“inward” cases, whereas Daily Mail and Cartesio cases can be 
categorised as “outward” cases. In the “immigration” case law, the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice show that the national 
provisions of private international corporate laws, that were 
considered to constitute a restriction on the Freedom of 
Establishment, must comply with the four rules of the Gebhard case 
test156.  Instead, the decisions of the Court rendered in Daily Mail 
and then in Cartesio appear to confirm the considerable power left 
to the EU Member States of incorporation over the company formed 
under their corporate laws. 
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However, the European Court of Justice, even in its “outward” 
decisions did not left untouched the power of the EU Member States 
to regulate companies’ establishment. In fact, in its decisions the 
Court specified that, in a situation where a company governed by 
the law of one Member State moves to another Member State with 
the will to be subject to the national corporate law of the host 
Member State and to convert into a form of company which is 
governed by the law of the Member State to which it has moved, any 
restriction to the transfer of the company seat will be considered by 
the European Court of Justice as a Freedom of Establishment 
restriction. Thus, the Court would allow the EU Member State of 
incorporation to hinder the moving of a corporation only when the 
company  wants to transfer its seat in another EU Member State 
while at the same time retaining its status (i.e. its “nationality”) as a 
corporation subject to the laws of the EU Member State of 
incorporation. 
The Advocate General Maduro in his opinion showed his criticism 
with respect to the European Court of Justice judgement. According 
to his point of view, the Daily Mail judgement was not a good ground 
of decision. Maduro took up from the European Court of Justice’s 
statement in which it was affirmed that the provisions concerning 
the Freedom of Establishment did not allow an EU Member State of 
incorporation to hinder the establishment into another EU Member 
State of one of its nationals (including its companies formed under 
the rules of its corporate law).157 Then, the Advocate General 
continued his thought158 resuming the argument of the Advocate 
General Tizzano that in his opinion stated that: “Article 43 EC does 
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not merely prohibit a Member State from impeding or restricting the 
establishment of foreign operators in its territory, it also precludes 
it from hindering the establishment of national operators in another 
Member State”.159 Thus, once a corporation has been validly formed 
in a given EU Member State and therefore it falls within the scope of 
article 54 of the TFEU should be free to benefit from the right of 
Establishment.  
The Advocate General Maduro admits that in some circumstances 
the national corporate law could require the compliance of some 
conditions before allowing the transfer of the real seat of a 
corporation formed under its national law. These conditions are 
acceptable when the EU Member State wants to prevent abuse or 
fraudulent conduct or the protection of interests of creditors, 
minority shareholders, employees or tax authorities of the 
corporation. In the same way, in a situation where the EU Member 
State of incorporation is no more able to monitor and control a 
corporation transferring its seat, a possible solution could be “to 
require that the company amends its constitution and ceases to be 
governed by the full measure of the company law under which it was 
constituted”, so that the corporate law of the EU Member State 
where it transferred its real seat will govern it.160 
The European Court of Justice decision in Cartesio adopted a 
different point of view in respect to the line of reasoning of the 
Advocate General Maduro. The Court reaffirmed its previous 
reasoning in the Daily Mail  judgement. Thus, it appears that the 
line of reasoning behind its judgment is that the Community law 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment provided the 
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possibility to choose the corporate law most suitable for 
entrepreneurs. However, once the corporation is established into one 
of the EU Member States, according to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice, if it wishes to transfer its actual centre 
of administration to another Member State, whilst retaining its legal 
personality in the EU Member State of establishment, could be 
hindered by the State of origin in moving its real seat. 
On the contrary, a situation where a corporation validly established 
in one Member State, decides to transfer its seat with an application 
asking the change of the applicable national law, it has a different 
treatment by the European Court of Justice. In this kind of 
situation, any restrictions enforced by the EU Member State of 
establishment on the Freedom of Establishment must comply with 
the Gebhard test. 
The solution founded by the European Court of Justice in Cartesio 
would not satisfy the opinion of the Advocate General Maduro, 
because, according to the opinion of the Advocate General any type 
of restrictions to the Freedom of Establishment should be 
prohibited. The decision of the European Court of Justice to prohibit 
the obstacles put by the EU Member State of incorporation to a 
company aiming to transfer its seat into another EU Member State 
whereas it wants to be subject to the law of  the host Member State, 
is only partially compliant with the solution fostered by the Advocate 
General Maduro.161 
Some critics raised from a comparison between the decision of the 
European Court of Justice in Cartesio and that taken in Sevic. In the 
Sevic case the Court ruled that the denial of the cross-merger of a 
German corporation with a corporation of Luxemburg was not 
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allowed by the provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
In particular, the Sevic case law concerned “the recognition, in the 
Member State of incorporation of a company, of an establishment 
operation carried out by that company in another Member State by 
means of a cross-border merger”. Sevic case was identified by the 
ECJ as an “inbound” case and treated accordingly. On the contrary, 
the Court interpreted Cartesio as an “outbound” case.  
In this way, the Court confirmed a method of ruling that 
distinguishes between immigration and emigration case. According 
to Borg-Barthet’s opinion, this approach of the European Court of 
Justice created a situation that does not guarantee legal certainty. 
The author identifies two weak points in the ECJ decision: the first 
is the discrimination between similar cases based on the “inbound” 
vs. “outbound” principles and the second is the distance with 
general body of jurisprudence, which deals with fundamental 
freedoms. 162 
An article of Dr. Petronella pointing that the Sevic System case law 
shared some common elements with the Cartesio case law enforces 
this approach: firstly, both the cross-merger and the cross-transfer 
of seat are cross-border operation that the European Court of 
Justice recognises as an admissible exercise of the right of 
Establishment; secondly, these cross-border operations are not 
regulated and the national provisions are not able to provide a good 
law.163 
An opinion favourable to the ECJ decision on Cartesio was expressed 
by Dr. Paschalidis who observed that the previous critical opinions 
are focused on Freedom of Establishment principles as it was stated 
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by article 49. TFUE, but do not keep enough in consideration which 
ruled by article 54 TFUE (conditions giving right to be subject to the 
Freedom of Establishment).  
However, the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Cartesio 
enforced the distinction it had already operated between “inbound” 
and “outbound” cases and continues to foster the EU Member States 
LoBOs able to “hinder” the emigration of the companies, thus, in 
fact, limiting the scope of the right of Establishment. 
 
3.9.3.b The status of “Real Seat” doctrine after Cartesio  
Doubts related to applicability of the real seat theory within the 
European Union were cast by the Cartesio judgement of the 
European Court of Justice. According to the European Court of 
Justice, a EU Member State is free to choose both the connective 
factors that a corporation must respect if it wants to be incorporated 
under the law of the EU Member State and those mandatory 
connecting links (i.e. “national” of) for the corporation to retain its 
status of company belonging to the EU Member State of 
incorporation. The Court’s reasoning continues as follows: “That 
power includes the possibility for that Member State not to permit a 
company governed by its law to retain that status if the company 
intends to reorganise itself in another Member State by moving its 
[registered or its real] seat to the territory of the latter, thereby 
breaking the [applicable] connecting factor required under the 
national law of the Member State of incorporation.”.164 
However, the scope of the real seat theory was narrowed by previous 
judgements, because the European Court of Justice specified that 
the application of the real seat theory, by the host EU Member State, 
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cannot deny the legal personality of a corporation which transferred 
its real seat there in compliance with EU Member State of 
incorporation. Thus, after Cartesio, all doubts concerning the 
prevalence of one of recognition theories ceased, because the 
incorporation theory and the real seat theory were put on the same 
level. 
3.9.3.c An analysis on the developments of the connecting factors set 
forth under Article 54 TFEU 
The Cartesio ruling has been criticised by some authors, because 
the European Court of Justice did not seem to follow its previous 
reasonings expressed in Centros and Überseering cases. The 
European Court of Justice, in point n. 21 of Daily Mail case affirmed 
that the connecting factors included in article 48 of the EC Treaty 
(at present these connecting factors are part of article 54 par.1, 
TFEU) are to be considered at the same level. In Centros and 
Überseering, the Court stated that the company’s place of registered 
office, central administration and place of business served as the 
connecting factors between a legal person and the legal system of a 
Member State in the same way as nationality does it in case of a 
natural person.165 
In Centros and Überseering, the European Court of Justice 
considered the presence of any of the three connecting factors as a 
sufficient condition for enforcing the provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment. 
In the Cartesio, the European Court of Justice, although pointing 
again the equivalence of the connecting factors, at the end affirmed 
that the choice of the applicable connecting factors was a matter 
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that should be faced by EU Member States through future legislation 
and conventions.166 
It appears that the issue of the connecting factors equivalence was 
interpreted in an opposite way between on one hand Centros and 
Überseering judgements and on the other hand Cartesio judgement. 
In Centros the equivalence of the connective factors allows the 
corporation to benefit of the right of Establishment, whereas in 
Cartesio case decision and also in the previous Daily Mail case 
judgement the equivalence of the connecting factors was considered 
by the European Court of Justice not sufficient to override national 
laws, directly applying the provision concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment. 
According to Dr Borg-Barthet, this reasoning was based on the 
observation made by the European Court of Justice in the Daily Mail, 
where the Court held that the right of a corporation to transfer its 
seat was subject to the adoption of future legislation still to be 
adopted according to the Article 293 of the EEC Treaty. Then, the 
European Court of Justice, in Centros did not consider the Articles 
293 of the EC Treaty. Moreover, the Court, in Überseering, specified 
that article 293 of the EC Treaty did not constitute a reserve of 
legislative competence vested in the Member States, but it only 
provided EU Member States with the necessary joint legislative 
powers in order to reach the objectives of the Treaty with respect to 
companies. Finally, in Cartesio, the European Court of Justice 
resumed its old statement exspressed in Daily Mail, whereby it 
appears that the right of Establishment did not have direct effect. 
Thus, the presence of any of the three connecting factors would not 
trigger the application of the provisions concerning the right of 
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Establishment. The Court closed its argument in Cartesio by 
affirming that the EU Member States have the right to decide the 
connecting factors necessary for a company to be established and to 
continue to exist under their respective national corporate laws. The 
Author concluded its reasoning arguing that the Cartesio judgement 
was not sufficiently clear; therefore, the decision of the European 
Court of Justice did not create a new path in order to understand 
the role of the connecting factors in the corporation transfer of seat. 
In conclusion, it is not clear when the provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment have a direct effect or not.167 
A possible solution hypothesized by Dr. Paschaldis in order to 
successfully transfer Cartesio administrative seat in Italy, was to 
transfer it without making any request to the Hungarian authorities. 
At that time the Hungarian commercial register did not monitor the 
real seat position. Then, in such situation, the Hungarian 
authorities could have considered the board of directors meetings of 
Cartesio not valid, because they were not held where the place of 
incorporation was located. Then, the corporation could have tried to 
dispute the validity of the Hungarian corporate provisions requiring 
the same location for the registered and the real seats. Instead, the 
corporation did not try to dispute the validity of the real seat theory 
with the provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. In 
sum, Cartesio could have a better chance to demonstrate that the 
Hungarian corporate law provisions concerning transfers of seat 
abroad corresponded to a restriction of the right of Establishment. 
In fact, the application of the real seat theory usually involves the 
application, by the domestic courts, of the law where the real seat is 
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located. In addition, the real seat theory normally does not require 
the same location for registered and real seat.168 
3.10 Vale 
3.10.1 The Facts 
The case law concerned the cross-border conversion of corporations 
within the single market. VALE Costruzioni Srl was an Italian limited 
liability company (s.r.l.) registered in the Rome commercial register. 
On 3 February 2006, VALE Costruzioni asked to the Italian 
authority to be removed from the Rome commercial register, because 
it aimed to transfer its seat and all its economic activity in Hungary. 
The Italian authority accepted the demand and removed, on 13 
February 2006, VALE Costruzioni from the commercial register. 
Within the register under the heading “Removal and transfer of seat” 
was added an entry specifying that the corporation moved to 
Hungary. In fact, in the Italian commercial register, it was written 
that VALE Costruzioni selected Budapest as place of its new 
registered seat. 
On 14 November 2006, the director of the VALE Costruzioni, 
together with another natural person, adopted the act of 
incorporation of the VALE Építési kft. VALE Építési is a limited 
liability company formed under the Hungarian law, that wanted to 
be registered in the Hungarian commercial register. In the preamble 
of the act of incorporation of VALE Építési was written, “the company 
originally established in Italy in accordance with Italian law has 
decided to transfer its seat to Hungary and to conduct business in 
accordance with Hungarian law”. 
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On 19 January 2007, the Corporation submitted an application at 
the Fővárosi Bíróság (the Court of Budapest) for the registration of 
the VALE Építési under the Hungarian law. VALE Costruzioni was 
indicated as the predecessor in law of the VALE Építési in its 
application. 
The Court of Budapest rejected the application for the registration 
of the VALE Építési in the commercial register and the Fővárosi 
Ítélőtábla (the Regional Court of Budapest) in its judgement of the 
appeal made by the corporation shared the same point of view. The 
Regional Court of Budapest rejected the application of VALE Építési 
because the Hungarian law did not allow a corporation formed and 
registered into another EU Member State to transfer its seat to 
Hungary and did not allow the corporation to benefit of the 
registration in the commercial register. However, Hungarian 
legislation allowed a corporation formed and incorporated in 
Hungary to be registered in the national commercial register as the 
predecessor in law of a company: but Hungarian law did not allow 
such a registration, if the predecessor was a company incorporated 
in another EU Member State. 
VALE Építési brought an appeal to the Supreme Court of Hungary 
specifying that the refusal of the Hungarian Courts amounted to a 
restriction of its Freedom of Establishment, protected under EU law. 
3.10.2 The Judgement 
The European Court of Justice had to solve the case of a transfer of 
seat of a limited corporation validly formed according the law of one 
Member State. This corporation then decided to be removed from the 
commercial register of the EU Member State of incorporation in 
order to transfer its seat and to be registered in the company register 
of the host EU Member State, thus changing the applicable law 
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under which it was to be governed. Moreover, the European Court 
of Justice had to decide whether the provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment should be applied and, if so, the effect of 
these provisions on the main proceedings. 
The European Court of Justice with the first two questions of the 
referring Court had to decide whether articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU 
did or did not allow national law of the destination State to impede 
a corporation validly incorporated in another EU Member State from 
converting and being incorporated into a company of that EU 
Member State of destination. 
The European Court of Justice declared that the Hungarian 
provisions fell within the scope of articles 49 and 54, TFEU. The 
Court concluded that the Hungarian provisions, allowing the 
conversion of the Hungarian national companies but, on the 
contrary, not allowing the same operation to a corporation formed 
into another EU Member State, were against the aims and the scope 
of Articles 49 and 54, TFEU.169 
The European Court of Justice rejected the considerations made by 
the Hungarian, German, United Kingdom and Ireland Governments, 
which argued that the Hungarian provisions did not fall within the 
scope of Articles 49 and 54, TFEU, because a cross-border 
conversion lead to the incorporation of a company in the host 
Member State. 
The European Court of Justice specified that a Member State has 
the power to identify both the connecting factors required to a 
corporation in order to be considered as incorporated under its 
national law and the connecting factors necessary for it to retain its 
status of corporation validly formed under the law of the EU Member 
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State of incorporation. According to the Court, a cross-border 
conversion, allowed under articles 49 and 54, TFEU, did not hinder 
or affect the power of the host EU Member State to identify its 
provisions that would govern and rule the incorporation and 
functioning of the company resulting from the cross-border 
conversion. Thus, the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment fall within the scope of articles 49 and 54, TFEU.170 
Then the European Court of Justice analysed whether there was a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment and if a possible 
justification for such a restriction existed. The Court noted: “the 
concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of establishment involves the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in the 
host Member State for an indefinite period. Consequently, it 
presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in that 
State and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there.”171 
Then, the European Court of Justice identified a restriction on the 
right of Establishment, because the national provisions allowed only 
conversions of corporations having their seats already placed in 
Hungary. According to the Court’s point of view, such national 
legislation represented a Freedom of Establishment restriction, 
because it treated differently the conversion of a national 
corporation and the cross-border conversion of a foreign 
corporation. In this way, corporations of the other EU Member States 
resulted disadvantaged in exercising their Freedom of Establishment 
in Hungary. 
The European Court of Justice explained that the absence of a 
European Union secondary law concerning the cross-border 
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conversions did not justify a different treatment, by national laws, 
of cross-border conversions, in comparison with the domestic 
conversions. Thus, the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment should be applied, even if there was not a European 
secondary law.172 
Restrictions of the Freedom of Establishment based on the ground 
of overriding reasons in the public interest173, preservation of the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision and fairness of commercial 
transactions may be justified by the European Court of Justice. 
However, such restrictions must comply with the Gebhard four 
points test.174  
The European Court of Justice concluded its reasoning concerning 
the first two questions of the referring Court stating that “Articles 49 
and 54, TFEU, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation 
which enables companies established under national law to convert, 
but does not allow, in a general manner, companies governed by the 
law of another Member State to convert to companies governed by 
national law by incorporating such a company.”175 
Finally, the European Court of Justice answered the third and 
fourth questions. The referring Court asked whether articles 49 and 
54, TFEU, allowed the host EU Member State to determine the 
national law to be applied to cross-border conversions. In particular, 
the referring Court was wished to understand whether the host EU 
Member State may refuse, for cross-border conversions, the notation 
of “predecessor in law” within the commercial register, because this 
notation was required to be filed with the commercial register of 
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Hungary only for the domestic conversions. And furthermore, it 
wished to know whether and to what extent the host EU Member 
State, during the corporation registration, should trust the 
documents issued by the authorities of the EU Member state of 
origin. 
The European Court of Justice argued that the national law of the 
EU Member State of origin and the national law of the host EU 
Member State must govern the cross-border conversions, because 
the current European secondary law does not provide any rule able 
to manage cross-border conversions. However, articles 49 and 54, 
TFEU, even if not providing any applicable rule for the cross-border 
conversions, prescribed that corporations governed by the law on 
another EU Member States, trying to convert into a corporation 
governed by the law of the host EU Member State, must receive the 
same treatment, by the national law, of the national corporations of 
the host EU Member State.176 
The national provisions that, in absence of a European secondary 
law, will govern cross-border conversions must comply with the 
principle of equivalence177 and effectiveness178. 
Thus, Hungarian provisions, governing corporations incorporation 
and operations, related to domestic conversions, must be applied 
and respected by the corporation of anther EU Member State aiming 
at a conversion into a (new) company governed by the Hungarian 
law. However, the European Court of Justice found that the 
Hungarian authorities denial to indicate within the Hungarian 
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commercial register that VALE Costruzioni was the predecessor in 
law of the VALE Építési constituted a breach of the principle of 
equivalence. Moreover, the indication in the commercial register 
could be useful to inform creditors of the converting corporation. 
Finally, the authorities of the host EU Member State, during the 
examination for the corporation registration in the commercial 
register, must consider the documents issued by the authorities of 
the EU Member State of origin assuring the compliance of the 
provisions of its national law to that of host EU Member State. In 
fact, the refusal of the host EU Member State to consider the 
documents issued by the authorities of the EU Member State of 
origin (in this case, Italy) could make it impossible to complete the 
cross-border conversion. And, again, this would lead to a breach of 
the principle of effectiveness.179 
3.10.3 The effects of the VALE judgement 
The European Court of Justice, in VALE Costruzioni, interpreted the 
European Treaty provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment as providing a rule that would allow a corporation, as 
defined under article 54 of the TFEU, to benefit of the cross-border 
conversion rules designed for domestic conversions. 
The European Court of Justice specified in this decision that the 
only way to impede a cross-border conversion could be based on 
overriding reasons of the host State’s public interest. The European 
Court of Justice introduced, in a clear manner, the guiding 
principles of “effectiveness” and “equivalence”.  
In fact, in the SEVIC case, the European Court of Justice stated that 
a different treatment of a cross-border merger vis-à-vis a national 
merger would constitute a restriction of Freedom of Establishment 
                                       
179 Judgment of the Court, Case C-378/10, p. (48) and foll. 
101 
 
under EU laws; thus, the national provisions concerning the 
domestic merger should be applicable also to the cross-border 
merger. Yet, in the Sevic, the European Court of Justice did not 
introduce the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.  
Instead, in VALE Costruzioni the Court explained the meaning of the 
two principles: the principle of equivalence assures that the national 
rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
situations, whereas the principle of effectiveness assures that 
national provisions do not make impossible in practice or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the European Union legal 
order.180 
The European Court of Justice, while still in the absence of 
European secondary legislation, through its ruling in VALE allowed 
EU Member States to apply their provisions to the cross-border 
mergers (principle of equivalence). Whereas, at the same time, the 
ruling of the Court held that the national provisions of the host EU 
Member State cannot hinder or make it impossible to benefit of the 
cross-border mergers. Thus, the national provisions that are deemed 
to make a cross-border merger impossible should be modified or 
eliminated. In order to reduce the gap existing between EU 
legislation and domestic provisions of the EU Member States, the EU 
Parliament and the Council approved the Directive 2005/56/EC on 
cross-border mergers. 
The decision of the European Court of Justice brought an important 
change within the European law. At the first glance, the applicability 
of the two principles, within the European cross-border conversion, 
could appear clear and easily applicable. However, the Court’s 
judgement raises some doubts, because the absence of an European 
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secondary legislation complicates the understanding of the 
functioning of a cross-border conversion and the scope of the two 
aforementioned principles (of equivalence and of effectiveness).  
The European Court of Justice in VALE further stated that the 
corporate law provisions of the host EU Member State should be 
applied to cross border conversions, as, for example, those requiring 
the company to draw up lists of assets and liabilities and property 
inventories.181 The European Court of Justice also specified that the 
EU Member States, in absence of relevant European Union rules, 
ought to apply their detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the 
protection of the rights which individuals acquired under European 
Union law, so that the domestic laws of the EU Member State have 
the duty to govern this situations.182 In this way, the European 
Court of Justice allowed both the EU Member State of origin and the 
host EU Member State to apply their respective national provisions 
in cross-border transactions. In fact, the Court specified that the 
host EU Member State should take into account the documents 
issued by the authorities of the EU Member State of origin. Thus, in 
such a cross-border conversion, the corporation must comply with 
two domestic national corporate laws. 
The ruling of the European Court of Justice put the corporation 
aiming to fulfil a cross-border conversion in a complicate situation, 
because compliance with two different corporate laws could lead to 
great expenses of time and resources. Moreover, it could happen that 
the converting corporation cannot comply with all requirements of 
either national law involved in the transaction. Thus, while the 
principle of effectiveness could come help the corporation, the 
decision of which of the provisions should be respected or not by the 
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corporation would not be resolved by EU law. Thus, probably, the 
European Court of Justice will be called to resolve future issues 
concerning cross-border conversions.  
As already noted, the domestic legislation of both the host EU 
Member State and the EU Member State of origin, in the absence of 
an European secondary legislation and/or mutual conventions, 
have to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals already 
acquired towards the converting company. However, the cross-
border conversion could lead to situations were neither the corporate 
law of the host EU Member State nor the corporate law of the EU 
Member State of origin would lead to this result. Hence, the EU 
Member States should adjust their national laws in order to provide 
a better corporation stakeholders (including minority shareholders) 
interests protection. However, adjustments of the corporate law 
adopted by the EU Member State in order to protect stakeholders 
interest and allow cross-border conversions provide any guarantee 
to comply with the principle of effectiveness. Thus, such type of 
adjustments could in some cases result in a restriction of the 
Freedom of Establishment. 
The Advocate General Jääskinen underlined the need of an 
agreement among the EU Member States. In his opinion the 
Advocate General noted that the VALE Costruzioni, at the time of 
the proceeding, did not longer existed under the Italian laws; thus, 
the transfer of seat accepted by the Italian law could not be 
completed because the corporation ceased to exist. According to the 
point of view of the Advocate General, this event led to a situation of 
uncertainty, because it made unclear whom the property of the 
corporation assets belonged to, and, in particular, to whom belonged 
those assets invested in order to comply with the minimum capital 
requirements that were necessary for the incorporation of VALE 
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Építési in Hungary, and whose persons were to be held liable for the 
obligations of the company before its registration. On the other 
hand, at the time of the proceeding, VALE Építési did not exist as a 
legal person, under Hungarian law, because its registration was 
rejected by the Hungarian authorities. However, the corporation, 
even if not registered, according an Hungarian law had the legal 
capacity required to initiate proceedings as a party before the 
National Court and before the Court of Justice. 183 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice in VALE argued (as it did 
in the judgement of Cartesio) that a Member State “has the power to 
define both the connecting factor required of a company if it is to be 
regarded as incorporated under its national law and as such capable 
of enjoying the right of establishment, and the connecting factor 
required if the company is to be able subsequently to maintain that 
status”.184 Thus, the authorities of the EU Member State of origin, 
adopting the real seat theory, could be in the position, depending on 
their domestic regulation, of rejecting the removal of the corporation 
from its commercial register, and in this way to impede the transfer 
of the company into another EU Member State, whether the 
corporation decides not to move also its headquarters. Thus, it is 
possible for a EU Member State that applies the real seat theory to 
hinder the conversion and the transfer of the registered seat of a 
company aiming to move into a EU Member State that applies the 
incorporation theory. Finally, it is not always clear, according to 
present EU legislation, under which circumstances a company is 
allowed to complete a cross-border conversion.  
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The VALE Építési case law represents a good start in solving some 
of the issues concerning the cross-border conversions. However, 
some problems were still not solved, as, for instance, the protection 
of third parties related to the converting corporation. Moreover, the 
absence of a European secondary legislation and/or mutual 
conventions among EU Member States left it unclear what the future 
developments of the relation between the authority of the EU 
Member State of origin and the authority of the host EU Member 
State would be. 
SECTION 3.C: EU Case Law on Corporate Fiscal policy 
3.11 Introduction 
The judgments of the European Court of Justice in de Lasteyrie du 
Saillant185, Marks and Spencer186, Cadbury Schweppes187 and 
Commission v. Portugal188 are concerned with the relationship 
between Freedom of Establishment and fiscal policies applied by 
each of the EU Member States. 
In particular Lasteyrie du Saillant and Commission v. Portugal 
concerned capital gain issues, Marks and Spencer concerned losses 
deduction issues, Cadbury Schweppes concerned fiscal treatment of 
resident and non-resident subsidiaries’ profits and National Grid 
Indus concerned taxes on the exchange rate gains. This last case is 
also central because it pointed out the fiscal issues related to the 
transfer of the legal seat, from one EU Member State to another, of 
a corporation. 
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3.12 Lasteyrie du Saillant and Commission v. Portugal 
The case of de Lasteyrie du Saillant concerned a tax French law 
provision (in particular the article 167a of the French Code Général 
des Impôts), which required shareholders resident in France and 
aiming to transfer their tax residence into another EU Member State 
to pay taxes on capital gains that had not yet been achieved (i.e. 
realised).  
The European Court of Justice in its judgement argued that the aim 
of the article 52 of the Treaty prohibited the Member State of origin 
from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of 
its own nationals.189 
According to Court’s point of view, French tax law put a French 
company shareholder, aiming to transfer his tax residence into 
anther EU Member State at a disadvantage in comparison with a 
French company shareholder retaining his residence in France. In 
fact, the shareholder who retains his residence in France becomes 
liable to tax on income only when the capital gain is realised. On the 
contrary, for a shareholder deciding to transfer his tax residence 
abroad, according to France law, the increase on value becomes 
taxable even if profits have not yet been achieved. For the European 
Court of Justice, this different treatment of shareholders in relation 
with the taxation of value increase “is capable of having considerable 
repercussions on the assets of a taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax 
residence outside France, is likely to discourage a taxpayer from 
carrying out such a transfer”.190 Thus, the Court concluded its 
reasoning arguing that the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment, in particular those to be found under Article 52, 
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prohibited an EU Member State to enforce, provisions that allowed 
(in order to prevent tax avoidance) taxation of unachieved increases 
in value of the companies’ shares. 
In the Commission v. Portugal, the European Commission raised an 
objection against the tax legislation of the Portuguese Republic due 
to the different treatment of the unachieved capital gains, between a 
transfer of company activities to another Member State and the 
same operation made within the Portuguese territory, enforced by 
the Articles 76 A and 76 B of the Portuguese Corporation Tax Code 
concerns.  
The European Court of Justice affirmed that the provisions of the 
TFEU Treaty on Freedom of Establishment are aimed at ensuring 
that nationals and companies of a foreign EU Member State are 
treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of 
that State. Moreover, the European provisions prohibit the Member 
State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member 
State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its 
legislation. The Court continued indicating that, from the previous 
case law, “all measures which prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment must be 
regarded as restrictions on that freedom”.191 
According to the European Court of Justice point of view the 
Portuguese national tax provisions constitute a restriction of the 
right of Establishment, because in the event of transferring the 
registered office and the effective management of a Portuguese 
corporation into another EU Member State and in the case of partial 
or total transfer of the assets of a company not resident in Portugal 
but permanently established in the State to another Member State, 
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such a company is financially penalised, compared with a similar 
company maintaining its activities in Portugal. Thus, corporations 
deciding to transfer their registered seat or their real seat into 
another EU Member State are taxed on unachieved capital gains by 
Portuguese authorities. On the contrary, corporations deciding to 
transfer their registered seat or their real seat within Portugal will 
be only taxed on achieved capital gains. For the European Court of 
Justice such type of discrimination tends to discourage a 
corporation from transferring its activities from Portuguese territory 
to another Member State. 
3.13 Marks & Spencer 
Marks & Spencer was a company incorporated and registered under 
England and Wales law. The corporation was the holding company 
of a number of companies established in the United Kingdom and in 
other States.  
Marks & Spencer brought before the European Court of Justice the 
issue on whether a law of the United Kingdom, allowing a 
corporation formed in the United Kingdom to deduct losses made by 
its local (i.e. resident) subsidiaries from its taxable profits, but on 
the contrary not allowing the same deduction for losses incurred 
made by non-resident subsidiaries would comply with the European 
law Freedom of Establishment.  
The European Court of Justice stated that this different treatment 
between resident and non-resident losses constituted a restriction 
of the Freedom of Establishment. This was due to the fact that: “the 
exclusion of such an advantage in respect of the losses incurred by 
a subsidiary established in another Member State which does not 
conduct any trading activities in the parent company's Member 
State is of such a kind as to hinder the exercise by that parent 
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company of its freedom of establishment by deterring it from setting 
up subsidiaries in other Member States”.192 
3.14 Cadbury Schweppes 
Cadbury Schweppes was the UK resident parent company of the 
Cadbury Schweppes group, which consisted of companies 
established in the United Kingdom, in other EU Member States and 
in non EU States. 
The Cadbury Schweppes case concerned the different treatment 
between resident and non-resident subsidiaries made by the tax 
legislation of groups as implemented in the United Kingdom. United 
Kingdom tax laws considered taxable the profit of non-resident 
subsidiaries of the group, if the taxation level of the State where the 
subsidiary was established, on that profit was considerably lower. 
On the contrary, the profits of the resident subsidiaries were not 
considered as taxable income of the holding until actual distribution 
thereto. 
According to the UK Government’s point of view, the United Kingdom 
tax law was enforced in order to counter a specific type of tax 
avoidance. In facts, these tax law provisions were created in order to 
hinder the artificial transfer of profits by a UK resident company 
from the Member State in which they were made to a State with a 
considerably lower taxation (tax heavens), by establishing a 
subsidiary in that State (tax heaven) and then the carrying out of 
transactions intended primarily to effect such transfers to that 
foreign subsidiary. 
The European Court of Justice in this decision affirmed that such a 
legislation did not fully comply with the Freedom of Establishment 
provisions. This decision was due to the fact that the different 
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treatment between resident subsidiaries and non-resident 
subsidiaries caused a disadvantage for those resident companies 
that have a subsidiary subject, in another Member State, to a lower 
level of taxation on income. In fact, according to the point of view of 
the Court, such legislation discouraged corporations from 
establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member 
State in which it is subject to such a lower taxation level. 
3.15 National Grid Indus 
National Grid Indus was a limited liability company incorporated 
under Netherlands law. Until 15 December 2000 its place of effective 
management was located in the Netherlands. National Grid Indus 
had a claim against a corporation of the United Kingdom, the 
National Grid Company Plc. The rise in value of the Pound Sterling 
against the Dutch Guilder induced an (unrealised) exchange rate 
gain of the corporation’s claim. On 15 December 2000, National Grid 
Indus decided to transfer its administrative seat in United Kingdom. 
National Grid Indus, after the transfer of its administrative seat, was 
considered, according to Article 4 paragraph 3 of the Convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion193, to be resident in the United Kingdom. Therefore, only the 
United Kingdom was entitled to tax its profits and capital gains. 
Thus, during the final settlement of the unrealised capital gains at 
the time of the transfer, the tax Inspector in the Netherlands decided 
that the National Grid Indus should pay tax on the exchange rate 
gain. 
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The National Grid Indus refused the decision of the tax Inspector. 
Then, the main tax proceeding arrived before the European Court of 
Justice. 
The referring Court first asked to the European Court of Justice 
whether the taxation by the Member State of Incorporation, of a 
company that decided to transfer its real seat into another EU 
Member State, was contrary to the Freedom of Establishment.  
In response to such a question, the European Court of Justice ruled 
that “a company incorporated under the law of a Member State 
which transfers its place of effective management to another Member 
State, without that transfer affecting its status of a company of the 
former Member State, may rely on Article 49 TFEU for the purpose 
of challenging the lawfulness of a tax imposed on it by the former 
Member State on the occasion of the transfer of the place of effective 
management.”194 
The European Court of Justice stated that the transfer of the real 
seat of a corporation within the Netherlands is not subject to the 
taxation of unachieved capital gains. Thus, the different taxation of 
capital gains made by the Dutch authorities discouraged the will of 
a company incorporated under Netherlands law from transferring its 
real seat into another Member State. Therefore, this national 
legislation constituted a restriction of the right of Establishment. 
However, the European Court of Justice stated that the need to 
ensure a balanced allocation of fiscal rights between Member States 
could justify the enforcement of an exit tax. However, according to 
the European Court of Justice point of view the Dutch exit tax was 
disproportionate in the light of the specific circumstances; thus the 
national legislator was required to review its national law. Hence, 
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the national tax provisions requiring the payment of exit taxes on 
the amount of unrealized gains made by a company when it decides 
to transfer its seat could comply with the provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment, to the extent that they were not 
disproportionate. The European Court of Justice indirectly applied 
within this case the Gebhard test. In fact, the national tax provisions 
would not have complied with the aforementioned test, because they 
went beyond what is necessary in order to attain their objective. 
3.16 Comments on the cases on corporate fiscal policy 
Over time, the provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment 
started to affect many matters of law. The European Court of Justice 
in Sevic ruled that the cross-border mergers fell within the scope of 
the right of Establishment. Whereas, the Court in the VALE 
Costruzioni stated that also the conversion of a corporation may 
affect the right of Establishment. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice in its previous judgement 
(e.g. in the Sevic case) ruled that all domestic measures that would 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the Freedom 
of Establishment will be considered as a restriction of the right of 
Establishment, protected under Article 49 and 54 TFEU. 
In the case law analysed in the previous paragraphs, the European 
Court of Justice had also to decide on the compliance of tax policies 
enforced by the EU Member States to a corporation aiming to 
transfer its seat into another EU Member State. Thus, the provisions 
concerning the exit taxes, according to the point of view of the 
European Court of Justice, would also fall within the scope of the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
These cases concerned both the transfer from the EU Member State 
of origin of the seat of a corporation into anther EU Member State, 
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and the compliance and validity of the exit taxes required by the EU 
Member State to the corporation transfer of seat.  
The previous judgements of Daily Mail and Cartesio (both inward 
cases), were confirmed by the decisions took by the European Court 
of Justice in these case concerning tax laws. In fact, the previous 
statements of the European Court of Justice ruling that the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment which come 
within the definition contained in Article 54 TFEU, prohibiting the 
Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another 
Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated 
under its legislation, were resumed also in these tax cases. 
However, the decisions of the European Court of Justice showed 
that, for the Court, the exit taxes could comply with the European 
provisions, but the national tax rules must respect the principle of 
equivalence assuring that the national rules were not less favourable 
than those governing similar domestic companies’ situations. 
In fact, according to the European Court of Justice, the provisions 
of the Treaty allows, in case of transfer of the corporation’s real seat  
from one EU Member State into another EU Member State, the EU 
Member State of origin to tax a capital gain arising within its 
territory. 
According to the point of view of the Court, “such a measure is 
intended to prevent situations capable of compromise the right of 
the EU Member State of origin to exercise its powers of taxation in 
relation to activities carried on in its territory, and may therefore be 
justified on grounds connected with the preservation of the 
allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States.”195 
However, the powers of taxation of the EU Member States must be 
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applied in compliance with the principle of equivalence as again 
emphasised by the European Court of Justice in Commission v. 
Portugal. 
The provisions of the Treaty allows EU Member States to enforce 
national rules that permit taxation on unrealised capital gains in the 
event of a transfer of seat into another EU Member State or a cross-
border asset relocation. However, the national provisions on the 
taxation of unrealised capital gains must be designed in order to 
avoid the cash-flow problems, which could arise, in case of a transfer 
of seat into another EU Member State, from those Member States of 
origin that require the immediate recovery of the tax of capital gains 
not yet realized. 
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4.1 The Evolution of the Freedom of Establishment 
The Freedom of Establishment of companies within the European 
Union is disciplined by article 49 and 54, TFEU. The scope of the 
Freedom of Establishment, over time, faced several changes due to 
the cases submitted to the European Court of Justice. The evolution 
of the Freedom of Establishment started in 1988 with the Daily Mail 
case, and continued in 1999 with Centros, in 2002 with Überseering, 
in 2003 with Inspire Art, in 2005 with Sevic, in 2008 with Cartesio 
and finally in 2012 with VALE Costruzioni.  
The Daily Mail constitutes the first evolutionary step made by the 
Freedom of Establishment of companies. The statement of the 
European Court of Justice was particularly important, because the 
Court affirmed that the national provisions of the EU Member States 
could determine the incorporation and functioning rules of 
companies formed under their respective company law.  Thus, the 
EU Member States of Incorporation are to govern the conditions by 
which a corporation could form itself and the conditions necessary 
in order to transfer its seat into another EU Member State. In fact, 
the European Court of Justice affirmed: “unlike natural persons, 
companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of 
Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue 
of the varying national legislation which determines their 
incorporation and functioning”.196 
The Centros case of 1999 was another leading case, because the 
European Court of Justice affirmed the possibility for a corporation 
validly incorporated into a EU Member State to open a branch into 
another EU Member State, even if the corporation carries on its 
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economic activity only in the EU Member State where it opened its 
branch. 
Moreover, the ruling of the European Court of Justice introduced an 
important instrument in the analysis of domestic corporate law 
provisions, the Gebhard test, that was used in order to assess the 
compatibility of the restrictions enforced by a EU Member State 
towards the right of Establishment.  
However, the Centros case also faced the issue of the right of 
Establishment abuse. The European Court of Justice provided only 
a wide definition of “abuse”:  the Court Stated “that the fact that a 
company does not conduct any business in the Member State in 
which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only in the 
Member State where its branch is established is not sufficient to 
prove the existence of abuse”197 of its right of Establishment. 
In the cases following Centros, the European Court of Justice 
defined, on one hand, the scope of the power of the EU host Member 
States in restricting the Freedom of Establishment and in defining 
the legal personality of companies formed into another EU Member 
State. On the other hand, the European Court of Justice identified 
the situations in which corporations could benefit of the provisions 
concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
According to the Überseering judgement, the ECJ held that article 
293 of the EC Treaty should facilitate the attainment of the right of 
Establishment; However, the actual exercise of the Freedom of 
Establishment cannot be dependent upon the adoption of the 
conventions envisaged under by article 293 of the EC Treaty. 
Moreover, thanks to the ruling of the Court, a corporation validly 
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formed in one EU Member State is entitled to obtain the legal 
recognition within all the EU Member States. 
The scope of the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment was stressed and clarified again in the Inspire Art 
judgement. Through this judgement, the European Court of Justice 
defines the different roles held by the EU Member State of 
incorporation and by the host EU Member State, in connection with 
the right of Establishment of companies nationals of either Member 
State. The first was deemed to hold more power to discipline the 
transfer of its corporations, while the latter has a narrower scope to 
govern the Establishment of the corporations of the other EU 
Member States. In fact, the host EU Member State shall justify its 
provisions, which restrict the Freedom of Establishment, on the 
grounds identified by articles 52 TFEU and/or justified by the 
Gebhard test. 
Pursuant to the Sevic System case, corporations involved in a cross-
border merger could also rely on the provisions concerning the 
Freedom of Establishment. In fact, the European Court of Justice, 
confirmed that the right of Establishment “covers all measures 
which permit or even merely facilitate access to another Member 
State and the pursuit of an economic activity in that State by 
allowing the persons concerned to participate in the economic life of 
the country effectively and under the same conditions as national 
operators”.198 
The key decision rendered by the ECJ in the Cartesio case of 2008, 
led to focus on the different treatment of inbound cases as opposed 
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to outbound cases; it also fostered the long lasting discussion among 
scholars on the consistency of the “real seat” theory with the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment and, on this 
specific issue, the Court confirmed its precedent rendered in the 
Daily Mail case, back in 1988. 
The Freedom of Establishment reached another important 
development in VALE Costruzioni, a case of 2012. The European 
Court of Justice ruled that the cross-border conversions were also 
covered by the rules concerning the Freedom of Establishment. 
Moreover, this case was also important, because it introduced the 
principle of equivalence and principle of effectiveness. These two 
principles will be fundamental in future decisions in order to 
determine whether the domestic legislation of a EU Member State 
could lead to a breach of the EU provisions concerning the Freedom 
of Establishment. 
4.2 The problem of the Harmonization 
Articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, discipline the Freedom of Establishment for companies 
validly incorporated into a EU Member State and with their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the European Union: companies validly 
incorporated according to any law of business organization enacted 
in any EU Member State are deemed “national” of that EU Member 
State. 
Thus, these Treaty rules provided a “national” corporation with the 
right to establish itself into another EU Member State, in order to 
pursue an economic activity there. 
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Therefore, thanks to the right of Establishment, corporations can 
locate their seat and/or open agencies, branches or subsidiaries in 
whatever EU Member State they like to. 
On the end of the 1960s, the first effort made by the institutions in 
order to enforce the provisions concerning the Freedom of 
Establishment are based on the attempt to standardize corporate 
laws of the different EU Member States. The EU Member States 
should have ratified a special agreement among them, under Article 
293 of the EC Treaty. 
On 29 February 1968 the Convention on the Mutual Recognition of 
Companies was developed in order to achieve the aforementioned 
objective. However, the project was not ratified by the Netherlands, 
thus bringing this first effort to failure. 
The European institutions decided to develop a process of 
harmonization based on common contents, in order to standardize 
the company laws of the various EU Member States. The European 
institutions started to enforce a series of directives, able to respect 
the different national laws of the EU Member States, aimed at 
introducing a good basis for a common European company law. 
The European institutions, in one hand continued with the process 
of harmonization of the national corporate laws, while, on the other 
hand, introduced the European Company (SE). One of the objectives 
pursued by the European institution, with the introduction of the 
European Company, was to provide a corporate model accepted by 
all EU Member States regulations, in order to overcome the obstacles 
faced by the Freedom of Establishment. 
However, the program of harmonization of company laws of the 
Member States and of introduction of a common European statute 
for Corporation, pursued by the European institutions, was 
hindered by the differences existing among national corporate laws 
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of the EU Member States. In particular, the workers’ participation in 
the management and the regulation of groups of companies were 
(and still are) two subjects matter that caused several conflicts and 
multiple drafting of proposed directives and regulations that are still 
awaiting a definitive solution.199 
Fortunately, however, the process of company law harmonization 
received a boost from the judgements by the European Court of 
Justice: in fact, the rulings of the Court in the various cases, that 
have been analysed in chapter 3 (retro), provided an important 
support in reducing the differences among the national rules of the 
EU Member State. 
In fact, the Centros decision permitted to corporations, which fell 
within the scope of the Freedom of Establishment, to hold the 
registered seat in one EU Member State and the real seat into 
another EU Member State, in all those situations in which the 
national law allows such a split. However, under certain conditions 
set forth in Daily Mail (1988), a EU Member State can forbid 
corporations formed under its law from transferring their real seat 
out of its territory. However, a EU Member State cannot hinder a 
corporation, incorporated into another EU Member State, to carry 
on its economic activity therein; the place of the real seat should 
bear no influence under this respect. 
The European Court of Justice with its judgements has denied to 
the EU Member State the possibility to ban the transfer abroad (into 
another EU Member State) of the registered seat of a company 
established in its territory. Therefore, the European court of Justice 
afforded corporations the right to transfer their registered office in 
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another Member State, if the host EU Member State does not require 
at the same time the transfer of the real seat. 
Thus, the process of harmonization, together with the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice, provided the possibility for the 
entrepreneurs wishing to incorporate their business to choose, 
within the European Union, the most suitable corporate law for their 
corporations. In fact, the best corporate law could be selected, not 
only at the moment of the incorporation, but also during corporate 
life. 
The possibility for entrepreneurs to benefit of provisions concerning 
the Freedom of Establishment generated alarms among the EU 
Member States fearing a “race to the bottom” of the domestic 
corporate laws of the other Member States: in fact, corporations 
could decide to transfer their seat only in order to benefit of a 
“weaker” corporate law, i.e. a set of rules designed to foster the 
(economic) interests of some corporate stakeholders at the expenses 
of others. 
The “race to the bottom” feared by EU institutions, academics and 
single Member States was evocative of a similar phenomenon 
occurred within the USA in the last century: the State of Delaware 
became, in the United States of America, the most popular 
jurisdiction for incorporation or transfer of seat among US 
corporations, mainly thanks to its laxer system of corporate law and 
to the presence of  a highly qualified legal class. With rapid pace, the 
State of Delaware affirmed itself as the most active US State in the 
introduction and improvement of company law rules, in order to 
create an even more efficient legal system. However, in the long term, 
other States of the US started competing with Delaware in 
implementing corporate law rues that suited corporate 
constituencies, so triggering a sort of “race” among legal systems. 
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Thus, in the long term, the superiority of Delaware corporate law, 
reflected in the increasing number of new incorporations, was due 
to the ability to bring legislative innovation in its corporate law and 
to the efficiency of its legal class. 
Therefore, the experience of the United States was studied in order 
to predict the possible consequences of some ECJ holdings on the 
Freedom of Establishment on the national legal systems of the EU 
Member States. In fact, as showed by the case law, there are many 
companies that may have good reasons to transfer their registered 
office into another EU Member State, in order to benefit of the more 
efficient and more suitable legal system of the host EU Member 
State. For example, some companies, formed accordingly to the law 
of one EU Member State, may have the incentive to transfer their 
registered office into another EU Member State, in order to provide 
more guarantees to creditors and minority shareholders, with a 
consequent reduction in the cost of credit and capital.200 But, 
sometimes, the contrary may also be true. 
4.3 Conclusions 
The Freedom of Establishment could work properly only in a context 
where the differences that exist among the national rules of the EU 
Member States are minimised. 
As discussed in the former paragraph, over the years, the Freedom 
of Establishment evolved significantly. The failure of the 1968 
Convention among the EU Member States, brought the European 
institutions to develop a different solution in order to harmonize the 
national corporate laws. The European institutions utilised different 
types of legal act, as the European regulations, directives, decisions 
and recommendations, in order to harmonise the different legal 
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systems. However, particularly important was the role covered by 
the European Court of Justice, which defined the scope of the right 
of Establishment; even if the concerns about risks of a “race to the 
bottom” of the national corporate laws were suggested after some of 
its decisions (e.g. Centros) triggered by the Freedom of 
Establishment, the process of harmonization continued. Moreover, 
the judgement of the European Court of Justice, resolved most 
issues about the compliance of the real seat theory, with the 
provisions concerning the Freedom of Establishment. In fact, an 
analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Justice in the 
different cases, showed that, according to the Court, the real seat 
theory is substantially consistent with the right of Establishment, as 
it was set forth under Article 49 of the TFEU. The judgement of the 
Court could only narrow the scope of the EU Member States when 
applying the real seat theory. 
In my opinion, the concerns about the regulatory competition, which 
could become a “race to the bottom” among the EU Member States, 
have been refuted. In fact, the EU Member States did not develop 
strong incentives to provide a “popular” legal form for the entire 
Union.201 However, the European directives will frame this 
competition among the national provisions of the EU Member States. 
Thus, this particular situation should be sufficiently safe in order to 
avoid a “race to the bottom”. 
Moreover, a competition among the national corporate laws of the 
EU Member States could lead the more efficient of them to improve 
their national provisions and, consequently, to attract a higher 
number of corporations. At the same time, this competition could 
lead the less efficient EU Member States to develop and to adopt 
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rules more appreciated by the legal class. Thus, this kind of 
competition could trigger a virtuous competition among the different 
national laws. 
The harmonization necessary to the complete functioning of the 
Freedom of Establishment will be also useful in order to reduce the 
issue of the “forum shopping”.202 Thus, the harmonization of the 
national provisions could improve, on one hand, the equity and, in 
the other hand, the efficient administration of justice.  
The Freedom of Establishment is one of the fundamentals economic 
Freedom of the European Union. The proper functioning of the right 
of Establishment is necessary for the good functioning of the whole 
Internal Market of the European Union. Thus, the proper 
functioning of the Freedom of Establishment is essentially intended 
to reach, for the Internal Market, an increased competition, an 
increased specialisation, larger economies of scale, and to allow to 
goods and factors of production to move to the area where they are 
most valued, thus improving the efficiency of the allocation of 
resources. 
In my opinion, the only way to reach a good functioning of the 
Freedom of Establishment is to continue in the process of 
harmonization of the different national provisions. 
The European Court of Justice, over years, through its ruling 
identified the scope of the right of Establishment. In fact, in the Sevic 
System case the Court decided that the cross-border mergers fell 
within the right of Establishment. Then, the Directive on cross-
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subject to different law. The different connecting factors applied by the 
jurisdictions of the States could lead into a situation where in line of principle 
both the national Court could hand the case. Thus, the party could try to stand 
before the national Court that it considers more convenient. 
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border mergers removed the gap existing by the judgement of the 
Court and the absence of a EU secondary law.  
The case law and the judgements of the European Court of Justice 
showed that there is need of more European Directives (or 
Regulations) in order to sustain the decisions of the Courts. For 
example, European Directives aimed at the discipline and 
harmonisation of the provisions of the EU Member States concerning 
cross-border conversions, some common fiscal policy among the EU 
Member States and the regulation of the effects of the equivalence 
principle of the domestic connecting factors listed under article 54.1 
TFEU, would help in building a common core of corporate rules 
within the “internal” market of the EU. 
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